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I. INTRODUCTION

Punitive damages occupy a special place in the U.S. legal
system. Courts award them in very few cases, yet they have been the
center of tort reform efforts because of their controversial nature.'
This controversy centers around the purposes for which punitive
damages are awarded-to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter
future bad acts. 2 While compensatory damages exist to redress specific
harms and to compensate a victim for a particular harm suffered,
punitive damages exist to further the much broader social goals of
retribution and deterrence. 3
Because punitive damages must be calibrated to achieve these
broad social goals, they necessarily involve more discretion on the part
of the adjudicator awarding them. Adjudicators may receive some
guidance when setting the final award amount, but this guidance is
often minimal when provided at all.4 The broad discretion exercised by
adjudicators combined with a lack of guidance has created a system
with the potential to impose very large and unpredictable punitive
damages awards on defendants. 5 While punitive damages can
efficiently deter defendants when compensatory damages are not large
enough to induce defendants to take the appropriate amount of
caution in their activities, 6 large and unpredictable awards tend to
have a chilling effect on desirable activities. Empirical evidence has
demonstrated that punitive damages do not actually provide strong
incentives for defendants to take extra precautions in their activities
and that they can even systematically harm consumers.'
For a full list of tort reforms concerning punitive damages, see Punitive Damages
1.
Reform, Am. TORT REFORM ASS'N, http://www.atra.orglissues/punitive-damages-reform (last
visited Feb. 10, 2013).
See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 415-23 (2003)
2.
(discussing the standards for awarding punitive damages established by Cooper Indus. v.
Leatherman Tool Grp., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001), and BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,
568 (1996)).
3.
Id. at 415-23.

See Alison Del Rossi & W. Kip Viscusi, The Changing Landscape of Blockbuster
4.
PunitiveDamages Awards, 12 AM. L. & EcON. REV. 116, 117 (2010) (discussing the shortcomings
of juries in awarding punitive damages when they lack meaningful guidance).
Compare Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J.
5.

LEGAL STUD. 623 (1997) (undertaking a thorough empirical study on punitive damages and
finding a predictable and insignificant effect), with A. Mitchell Polinsky, Are Punitive Damages
Really Insignificant, Predictable, and Rational? A Comment on Eisenberg et al., 26 J. LEGAL
STUD. 663 (1997) (disagreeing with this interpretation).
6.
STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 243-47 (2004).
7.
See generally Paul H. Rubin, John E. Calfee & Mark F. Grady, BMW v. Gore:

Mitigating the Punitive Economics of Punitive Damages, 5 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 179 (1997); W.
Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against Corporations in Environmental and
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Because of the potential for very large and unpredictable
awards, both legislatures and courts have taken action to limit
punitive damages awards.8 Recently, the Supreme Court has invoked
the Due Process Clause to place constraints on punitive damages and
"grossly excessive awards."9 The Court began by limiting the
discretion of judges and juries to award punitive damages, and the
Court's restrictions culminated in essentially placing a cap on the
ratio of punitive to compensatory damages that could be awarded in a
given case. 10
Currently, the Court's doctrine on punitive damages is
somewhat nebulous. While it has articulated what goals punitive
damages may accomplish-punishment and deterrence-it has
provided no guidance on how states may accomplish those goals."
Additionally, while it has announced some general limitations on
awards through a vague reasonableness inquiry, the only specific
limitation has proven both arbitrary and ineffective. This Note
demonstrates that the current limitations on punitive damages are
inconsistent with the stated goals of these damages and have an
inconsistent effect across the full range of punitive damages awards.
More specifically, this Note addresses punitive damages in two
contexts. First, it provides a thorough empirical evaluation of the
current doctrine, focusing on the virtual cap imposed by the Court in
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell to
determine what effects that cap has had on punitive damages awards.
This Note builds on and extends previous empirical research
regarding punitive damages and demonstrates that even though the
cap should have decreased award amounts, it has not had that effect.
In fact, some evidence suggests that awards may have actually
increased after the Court imposed the cap. Second, this Note discusses
how the lack of the intended effect combined with other fundamental
flaws in the reasoning underlying the current limitations on punitive
damages indicates the need for a new doctrine.
The new doctrine proposed here replaces the current punitive
damages framework with a simplified version that requires individual
Safety Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285 (1998); W. Kip Viscusi, Reply, Why There Is No Defense of Punitive
Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 247 (1998).
8.
See AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N, supra note 1 (discussing reforms, listed by state, and the
problems they are intended to solve).
9.
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 567 (1996).
10. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (discussing
how greater than single-digit ratios of punitive to compensatory damages will almost never be
allowed to stand out of due process concerns).
11. See, e.g., id., at 425-30; Gore, 517 U.S. at 562-69.
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courts to match punitive awards to civil fines or penalties authorized
by state legislatures in similar cases. This new framework eliminates
both the vague reasonableness inquiry and the ratio cap from the
current doctrine. While the framework proposed here does not
perfectly address all of the shortcomings of the current doctrine, it
does have three important advantages. First, because state
legislatures can authorize civil fines and penalties as they see fit,
policymakers have enough flexibility to address specific problems on a
more individualized basis if they choose. Second, because the proposed
framework is based on the current doctrine, the Supreme Court could
adopt it in the next punitive damages case it decides without
reworking the constitutional underpinnings of its punitive damages
jurisprudence. Third and most importantly, because the proposed
doctrine requires that adjudicators determine all punitive awards by
matching them to similar civil penalties or fines authorized by a
legislature, defendants can easily predict what liability they may face.
Part II of this Note briefly outlines the history of the
constitutionality of punitive damages under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and provides some background on the
economic theory of punitive damages. Part III both builds upon
previous research by presenting an empirical evaluation of the current
doctrine and demonstrates that the current framework does not
effectively limit typical punitive damages awards. Part IV outlines the
most salient problems with the Court's current punitive damages
doctrine. Part V presents a new framework that mitigates some of the
old doctrine's most glaring problems, while still allowing punitive
damages to accomplish the constitutionally permissible purposes for
which they are designed. Part VI concludes the discussion.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY AND ECONOMIC THEORY OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES

A. The Constitutionalityof Punitive Damages
The Supreme Court has addressed the constitutionality of
punitive damages in several contexts. It began by upholding the
constitutionality of punitive damages under the Fifth Amendment and
the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 12 After
providing a general authorization of punitive damages in its early
12. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-50 (1989), overruled by Hudson v.
United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997) (double jeopardy); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989) (Excessive Fines Clause).
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cases, the Supreme Court began developing limitations on punitive
damages under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 13 The Court first addressed them under the Due Process
Clause in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, holding that, in
general, the Clause does not prohibit the imposition of punitive
damages. 14 While the Court in Pacific Mutual did not fully insulate
litigants from the threat of punitive damages, 15 it did place some
limitations on awards. In general, the Court sought to limit "grossly
excessive" punitive damages awards, holding that such awards violate
the Due Process Clause.16 Grossly excessive awards violate the Due
Process Clause because defendants lack notice that they may be
subject to such large awards and these large awards violate notions of
fundamental fairness.17
Contrary to what it would later imply, the Court held in Pacific
Mutual that it could not "draw a mathematical bright line between the
constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable
[amount of punitive damages] that would fit in every case."18 Instead
of using a formula or bright-line test to restrict punitive damages, the
Court held that "general concerns of reasonableness" will play an
important role in determining whether an award is grossly excessive
or constitutional.19 The Court further explained that the most
important factors in determining the constitutionality of a given
award concern "whether [the] punitive award is reasonably related to
the goals of deterrence and retribution."20
The Court next examined punitive damages in TXO Production
Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., holding again that reasonableness,
not any kind of mathematical formula, would determine whether a
punitive damages award passes constitutional muster. 21 The Court
held that the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages in the case, a
ratio of 526 to one, was reasonable and therefore did not violate due

13.

See Kimberly A. Pace, Recalibrating the Scales of Justice Through National Punitive

Damage Reform, 46 AM. U. L.. REV. 1573, 1573-85 (1997) (providing a detailed description of all
the ways in which the Court has addressed punitive damages through 1997).
14. 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 20-22.
17. Id. at 16-18.
18. Id. at 18.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 21. The Court listed seven factors that courts should consider when determining
whether a punitive damages award furthers these two goals. These factors essentially became a
totality of the circumstances test. Id.
21. 509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993).
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process. 22 TXO did little to clarify the reasonableness inquiry that
lower courts would be required to use when evaluating the
constitutionality of punitive damages awards. The Court gave no
further guidance on which factors were most important, holding that
no single factor was determinative of whether an award was grossly
excessive. 23
In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the Court provided
much clearer guidance on the nature, purpose, and limitations of
punitive damages. 24 Consistent with prior cases, the Court held that
"[p]unitive damages may properly be imposed to further a State's
legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its
repetition."25 The Court also explained that "[t]he Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a
'grossly excessive' punishment." 26 The Court offered more guidance
than the general reasonableness test articulated in earlier decisions
by providing three "guideposts."2 7 When determining whether an
award is grossly excessive, a lower court should consider the degree of
reprehensibility of the conduct, the disparity between the harm or
potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and her punitive damages
award, and the difference between the remedy and the civil penalties
authorized or imposed in comparable cases.28
The Court provided even more concrete guidance on what types
of awards would likely violate the Due Process Clause in State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell. In State Farm, the
Court provided a full discussion of the nature and purpose of both
compensatory and punitive damages, as well as a full discussion of
how the latter may violate the Due Process Clause. 29 The Court began
by explaining that while compensatory and punitive damages are
almost always levied against the same individual for the same act,
they serve entirely different purposes. 30 Compensatory damages
provide plaintiffs with redress for a specific and concrete injury and
have no role beyond that remedial purpose. 3 ' On the other hand, the
22. Id. at 462.
23. See Pace, supra note 13, at 1601 (discussing the lack of guidance provided by the
Supreme Court).
24. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
25. Id. at 567.
26. Id. at 562.
27. Id. at 574.
28. Id.
29. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 408 (2003).
30. Id. at 416.
31. Id.
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Court reiterated that punitive damages serve retributive and
deterrent functions. 32
After differentiating between the nature, function, and goals of
compensatory and punitive damages, the Court described how
punitive damages may be constitutionally problematic. Awarding
grossly excessive punitive damages violates notions of fundamental
fairness, fails to provide adequate notice to parties that they might be
subject to such large damages awards, and fails to further legitimate
interests of the state. 33 The Court also held that the reprehensibility of
the defendant's conduct is the most important factor in determining
the reasonableness of a particular award.34 While State Farm rectified
many of the deficiencies in punitive damages jurisprudence by
providing lower courts with clearer guidelines for how to evaluate the
constitutionality of awards, its most important contribution was its
virtual cap on the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages.3 5 The
Court held that "few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between
punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will
satisfy due process." 36 Thus, the Court held that ratios of ten to one or
higher will almost always violate due process.
While both scholars and lower courts have interpreted this as
an actual cap on punitive damages, 37 the cap in State Farm is
somewhat different from the statutorily imposed ratio caps that some
states have used to control punitive damages. While those caps place a
clear limit on the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, the cap
in State Farm does not place a hard-and-fast limit on that ratio.38 The
Supreme Court specifically declined to impose a bright-line ratio cap
that no punitive damages award could exceed. 39 Instead, the ratio cap
imposed was the result of a presumption that arose from past
constitutional jurisprudence concerning punitive damages and from
experience with this jurisprudence, rather than from any

32. Id.
33. See id. at 416-17 (describing the constitutional limitations of punitive damages).
34. Id. at 419.
35. See id. at 425 (discussing punitive damage ratios).
36. Id.
37. See Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Judge-Jury Difference in Punitive Damages
Awards: Who Listens to the Supreme Court?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 325, 347 (2011) (explaining
how most scholars and lower courts have interpreted the State Farm cap).
38. Compare State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425 (imposing a general cap that may be exceeded in
some situations), with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73 (West 2012) (imposing a cap on punitive
damages that can never be exceeded for any reason).
39. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425.
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mathematical considerations. 40 In other words, the Court opted for a
more discretionary ratio cap than those chosen by state legislatures.
The Court in State Farm also prohibited the imposition of
punitive damages for conduct that occurred outside the scope of a
given case. 41 The Court reiterated and expanded this prohibition in
Philip Morris USA v. Williams.42 Specifically, the Court explained
that evidence of harm to nonparties can be used to demonstrate that a
defendant's conduct posed a risk to the general public and was
therefore more reprehensible. However, adjudicators may not award
punitive damages to punish a defendant for harms to nonparties to
the litigation. 43
Overall, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on punitive
damages permits courts to use the awards to achieve two goals:
deterrence and punishment/retribution. Within this framework, the
Court has limited grossly excessive awards that violate fundamental
fairness and required that awards be reasonable. 44 In determining the
reasonableness of an award, lower courts must consider the three
guideposts from Gore, with the degree of reprehensibility being the
most important guidepost. 45 Most importantly, under the current
doctrine, ratios of punitive to compensatory damages that are greater
than single digits will most likely violate the Due Process Clause. 46
Before considering how effective the current doctrine has
proven in eliminating grossly excessive punitive damages awards, it is
important to consider more carefully the goals that doctrine seeks to
achieve. First, an inquiry into the reprehensibility of a defendant's
conduct neatly encompasses the goal of punishment and retribution.
Since reprehensibility is part of the reasonableness inquiry to
determine the appropriateness of a punitive damages award, only

40. See id. (describing how "[the Court's] jurisprudence and the principles it has now
established" provided information on ratios that were acceptable in practice). The Court
explicitly discusses ratios in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991), and
BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
41. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 422-23 ("A defendant's dissimilar acts, independent from
the acts upon which liability was premised, may not serve as the basis of punitive damages. A
defendant should be punished for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff, not for being an
unsavory individual or business.").
42.
127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007).
43. Id. at 1064.
44. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 416-18 (discussing constitutional problems with punitive
damages and factors to consider on review).
45. Id. at 418-19.
46. Id. at 425 ("[F]ew awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive damages and
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.").
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reprehensible actions will be punished under the current doctrine. 47
By punishing only reprehensible acts, the current doctrine will likely
adequately accomplish the goal of punishing defendants who deserve
that punishment. Second, the goal of deterrence is somewhat more
complicated. The current inquiry into punitive damages does not
involve any direct considerations of deterrence in the same way it does
for reprehensibility, so the goal of deterrence is slightly more elusive.
The next Section considers the goal of deterrence in more detail.
B. The Law and Economics of Deterrence
Although it is unclear when a punitive damages award
designed to deter becomes unconstitutionally large, the economic
theory of deterrence is much clearer.48 This theory provides useful
insight into one of the problems with the current doctrine-it is
logically inconsistent. Essentially, the theory posits that the optimal
level of punitive damages is the amount that forces a defendant to
fully internalize the cost of the harm it imposes on society.49 Once the
defendant fully internalizes the cost it imposes on others, it will have
the correct incentives to prevent imposing that harm in the first place.
By forcing a defendant to pay compensatory damages, a court can
force it to internalize the cost of the harm it imposes.50 However,
compensatory damages alone do not, in general, induce a defendant to
take the optimal amount of care.5 1 If a defendant is not held liable
every time it harms someone, then it does not fully internalize the cost
of that harm and, accordingly, will fail to take enough care to prevent

47. See id. at 418-19 (describing the degree of reprehensibility guidepost for a review of
punitive damages and stating that "punitive damages should only be awarded if the defendant's
culpability, after having paid compensatory damages, is so reprehensible as to warrant the
imposition of further sanctions to achieve punishment and deterrence").
48. For a general treatment of the economic theory of deterrence, see SHAVELL, supra note
6, at 243-47. For a thorough review of the economic theory of deterrence as well as punitive
damages more generally, see Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An
Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998).
49. See SHAVELL, supra note 6, at 243-45 (discussing how damages exceeding actual losses
may be appropriate in certain situations, such as escape from suit and illicit utility from causing
harm, where additional damages must be imposed for the actor to fully internalize the costs of
his or her actions).
50. See id. at 243-44 ("If damages are set equal to losses, incentives to reduce risk will
generally be desirable.").
51. Optimal care is the level of care at which the marginal cost of taking additional care to
mitigate or prevent harms is equal to the marginal benefit of taking additional care. This care is
optimal for society because any additional care forces society to incur more costs than the savings
that would result from that care. See id. at 243-47 (describing factors that are not accounted for
in compensatory damages that may lead to inadequate incentives to reduce risk).
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causing the harm in the first place. 52 Punitive damages can raise the
defendant's liability so that it does internalize the full cost it imposes
on others, inducing it to take the optimal amount of care.
For example, if a defendant knows that every time it acts it
causes a harm worth $100 but only has a 50% chance of being held
liable for that harm, it does not have an incentive to invest in the
amount of safety precautions society would prefer. Society would be
better off if the defendant paid $75 to eliminate the risk of harm, but
the defendant would not be willing to invest in that precaution
because it only faces an expected cost of $50.53 It would rather face the
expected cost of $50 (and continue inflicting the harm) than face a
certain cost of $75 to prevent the harm. To induce the defendant to
invest in precautions that are socially worthwhile (i.e., to take the
optimal level of care), its expected liability must equal the actual costs
it imposes on society. In this example, imposing a punitive damages
award of $100 in addition to a compensatory award of $100 (the value
of the harm inflicted) brings the defendant's total liability to $200.
Multiplying this amount by the probability of actually facing that
liability, 50%, the defendant faces an expected cost of $100, which is
exactly the cost of the harm it inflicts on society. With this punitive
damages award, the defendant now finds it worthwhile to invest in
precautions that cost less than $100, which is the socially efficient
outcome. In other words, the punitive damages in this example
achieve optimal deterrence by aligning the defendant's incentives with
society's preferences.
Obviously, the above example is a gross simplification, but it
illustrates that punitive damages can serve an important function in
achieving optimal deterrence. Formally, the punitive damages award
necessary to achieve optimal deterrence is determined by the
compensatory award 54 multiplied by the reciprocal of the probability
that the defendant will be held liable.55 Where PD denotes the
52.
See id. at 244 ("If injurers who sometimes escape suit are made to pay only the usual
level of damages on those occasions when they are sued, then their expected payments will be
less than the expected losses they generate. Consequently, their incentives to reduce risk will be
inadequate.").
53. The expected cost in this context is the cost of being held liable ($100) discounted by the
probability of being held liable (50%).
54. This analysis assumes that the compensatory damages award perfectly represents the
harm imposed by the defendant.
55. For the underpinnings of optimal deterrence, see SHAVELL, supra note 6, at 243-47.
The treatment of optimal deterrence and punitive damages here is very similar to the analysis in
Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries Perform, 33 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 3-4 (2004). I skip the full derivation of the optimal amount of punitive damages here for
the sake of brevity.
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punitive damages award, CD denotes the compensatory damages
award, and p denotes the probability with which a court will hold a
defendant liable, the formula that determines the punitive damages
award necessary for optimal deterrence is given by the following
equation:

PD + CD

=

*

CD

This equation can be rewritten to solve explicitly for the punitive
damages award necessary for optimal deterrence:
PD = 1 -p

CD

Using this formula, a court can theoretically determine the punitive
damages award necessary to induce optimal deterrence; however,
actually applying this straightforward formula can prove problematic
for a number of practical reasons.
State Farm and the associated punitive damages doctrine do
not allow for a full consideration of optimal deterrence,'56 and Part V
discusses how State Farm actually hinders achieving optimal
deterrence. However, before discussing the problems State Farm
creates for deterrence, Part III presents an empirical analysis of State
Farm to determine what effect, if any, it has had on punitive damages
awards.
III. AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF STATE FARMS EFFECTIVENESS IN
LIMITING PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS

While the Court in State Farm explicitly stated that it was
avoiding any strict mathematical formulas for punitive damages
awards, it did impose a generally applicable mathematical limit on
punitive damages that many scholars and courts have interpreted as a
functional cap on punitive damages.57 This cap could have important
implications for both the retributive and deterrence functions of
punitive damages by restricting the ability of courts to tailor damages
to these functions. However, because the Court was unclear about how
the cap should actually be applied, it is possible that lower courts have
not implemented it correctly, which might mean that the cap is not

56.
57.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 37, at 346.
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functioning to satisfy the requirements of due process by limiting the
predictability of punitive damages for defendants.
This Section provides an empirical evaluation of the effect of
this cap on actual awards. Other researchers have explicitly examined
the effect of the State Farm cap on "blockbuster" punitive damages
awards,58 finding that the cap does, in fact, decrease the size of such
awards.59 However, scholars have not directly addressed the effect of
the State Farm cap on "everyday" punitive damages awards.60 Some
scholars have addressed the question of how effective the ratio cap has
been in limiting punitive damages awards, but they have only done so
as part of a larger examination of the effect of having a jury trial
rather than bench trial has on these awards.61
This Section provides a new empirical analysis focusing on the
effect of State Farm. Throughout the analysis, I work from the basic
hypothesis that, all else equal, State Farm should reduce the number
of awards violating the single-digit cap. This hypothesis implies that
punitive damages awards should decrease overall since lower courts
must reduce some awards to comply with the ratio cap. Additionally,
the relationship between compensatory and punitive damages should
change so that, after State Farm, a given increase in compensatory
damages should lead to a smaller increase in the accompanying
punitive damages award. This change, which is actually a change in
the elasticity between compensatory and punitive damages, should
occur because after State Farm, lower courts are prohibited from
awarding higher levels of punitive damages for a given level of
compensatory damages in a way they were not prior to State Farm.
I find no support for the hypothesis that State Farm reduced
the number of awards violating the single-digit cap or that State Farm
decreased punitive damages awards overall. However, I find evidence
that State Farm actually had the surprising (and presumably
unintended) effect of increasing punitive damages awards. This
58. Hersch and Viscusi define a "blockbuster" award as any award exceeding $100 million,
and while these are the most visible and salient punitive damages awards, they are not
representative of typical awards. See Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 55, at 4-5.
59. Del Rossi & Viscusi, supra note 4.
60. By "everyday" awards, I mean punitive damages that are awarded in typical cases seen
across the country, as opposed to "blockbuster" awards, which occur only rarely and are the
exception rather than the rule in punitive damages awards. For the purposes of this empirical
analysis, "everyday" refers exclusively to punitive damages awards imposed by State Courts
because the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts only contains information on state court awards.
61. The most important and most extensive study to date has been conducted by Professors
Eisenberg and Heise. I review this study below. See Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 37, at 346
(evaluating the impact of the State Farm decision on punitive damages awards using 2005
damages data).
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surprising result has important implications for the limitations that
the Supreme Court has placed on punitive damages; namely, the
Court may need a new doctrine to ensure that those awards satisfy
due process.
Before delving into the empirical analysis and the implications
of the results of that analysis, this Section first briefly reviews the
previous empirical work on punitive damages. It then describes the
data and empirical methodology used in the analysis and discusses
how this methodology differs from previous work. It analyzes
summary statistics and concludes with a regression analysis that
controls for decision type, litigant pair, case type, and location, thus
isolating the impact of State Farm.
A. Prior Work on Punitive Damages and State Farm's Effectiveness
Most of the prior empirical work on punitive damages has been
conducted with the goal of identifying and explaining the
determinants of these awards. This research generally asks two
different questions: what factors increase the likelihood that punitive
damages will be awarded and what factors are associated with higher
awards. 62 In general, studies have found that higher levels of
compensatory damages are associated with both a higher likelihood
that punitive damages will be awarded and higher punitive awards.63
The type of case can also have a significant effect on both the

62. See Del Rossi & Viscusi, supra note 4, at 117 (updating preexisting data on blockbuster
awards and examining jurors' ability to award punitive damages proportionate to the
reprehensibility of behavior); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages:
EmpiricalAnalyses Using the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, 1996, and 2001 Data, 3
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263, 264-73 (2006) (concluding that jury and judge behavior
regarding the size of punitive damages is relatively stable over time, but varies over time
regarding other factors of damage awards); Eisenberg et al., supra note 5, at 626-30 (drawing on
one year of jury trial data to determine when punitive damages are likely and what factors affect
the size of the award); Eisenberg & Heise, supranote 37, at 346 (assessing State Farm's possible
impact on punitive damages level awards in 2005 data); Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 55, at 3-4
(applying law and economics theory to estimate optimal punitive damages awards to achieve
maximum deterrent effect); Polinsky, supra note 5, at 666, 671-73 (concluding that punitive
damages are a significant factor in litigation and are awarded randomly); Neil Vidmar & Mirya
Holman, The Frequency, Predictability,and Proportionalityof Jury Awards of Punitive Damages
in State Courts in 2005: A New Audit, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 855, 855, 860 (2009) (focusing on
jury verdicts only to determine trends in punitive damages awards in state courts).
63. See Eisenberg & Heise, supranote 37, at 346-47 (explaining the Court's commitment to
proportionality between punitive and compensatory awards); Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 55, at
29 (explaining regression results and the association between jury trials and higher levels of
compensatory damages awards).
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probability of awarding and the size of the award.6 4 For example,
intentional tort, products liability, premises liability, and fraud cases
all have higher probabilities and higher average amounts of punitive
damages than other types of cases. 65 In addition to the type of case,
the type of litigants involved in the case affects the award probability
and amount.66 For example, when an individual sues an individual,
courts are more likely to both award punitive damages and award
larger amounts.67
Perhaps the most significant debate in the punitive damages
literature involves the performance of judges and juries when
awarding punitive damages. Two studies using the 1996 Civil Justice
Survey of State Courts ("CJSSC")6 8 found different results: Hersch and
Viscusi identified a significant positive effect of having a jury trial on
both the probability of award and the size of the award, while
Eisenberg et al. did not find these effects. 69 These two studies differed
in the methodologies they used, and Hersch and Viscusi identified
several potential reasons why Eisenberg et al. did not find that juries
had a significant effect on punitive damages awards. 70 Thus, a
disagreement in the literature exists with respect to how judges and
juries may award punitive damages differently.
More recently, Eisenberg and Heise analyzed all four years in which
the CJSSC was collected and considered whether juries award
punitive damages differently than judges.71 Eisenberg and Heise
found that the "2005 data suggest, for the first time, systematic
64. See Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 55, at 29-30 (noting that individual plaintiff versus
individual defendant cases have a negative influence on compensatory awards as compared to
multiple plaintiff cases).
65. For a full list of the types of cases associated with a higher probability of award and
higher award levels, see Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 37, at 373 (summarizing the
characteristics of selected case types in punitive damage cases); Hersch & Viscusi, supra note
55, at 29 (analyzing the impact of fifteen different types of cases on compensatory damages
awards).
66. Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 55, at 29.
67. For a complete list of the effects of the types of litigants, see id. (detailing the
relationship between litigant pair and awards).
68. Although I do not use the 1996 survey, this dataset is part of the same series I use in
my empirical analysis. See infra Part III.B for a full description of later years in this dataset.
69. Compare Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 55, at 3-4 (explaining why the study reached
opposite conclusions from the study by Eisenberg et al. regarding judge and jury awards), with
Eisenberg et al., supra note 62, at 766-67 (explaining the impact of judge or jury cases on the
punitive damage award).
70. Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 55, at 1-2 (noting that the previous study included an
analysis that ignored differences across counties and a specification that induced
multicollinearity).
71. I use the last two years of the CJSSC in my analysis, and the data for 2001 and 2005
are described below.
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differences between judges and juries in the punitive-compensatory
relation."72 In the context of analyzing the systematic difference
between judges and juries, Eisenberg and Heise also considered the
effect State Farm may have had on this difference. They noted that
State Farm, which was decided in 2003, could account for the
systematic difference between judges and juries that they found in the
2005 data and did not find in the three years of data collected prior to
the State Farm decision.73 Specifically, the authors hypothesized that
judges would be more affected (i.e., tend to award lower levels of
punitive damages for a given level of compensatory damages) by a
Supreme Court decision limiting punitive damages awards than juries
would be because judges are more attuned to the law and have greater
incentives to avoid being reversed on appeal. 74 However, the authors
did not find support for their hypothesis in the data. They found mixed
evidence of a decrease in the size of punitive damages after State
Farm. They also determined that juries' awarding behaviors changed
more after State Farm than judges' did. 75 Therefore, the authors
rejected State Farm as a likely explanation for the systematic
difference they found between judges' and juries' awarding behaviors
in 2005.76 The authors considered
and rejected
alternative
explanations for the results they found, including more personal
injury cases in 2005 relative to other years, the inclusion of additional
counties in the 2005 sample, and changes in the data coding for the
2005 sample.77 The authors ultimately concluded that the most likely

72. Eisenberg & Heise, supranote 37, at 325.
73. Id. at 348-49.
74. Id.
75. Eisenberg and Heise arrived at this conclusion by comparing the relationship between
compensatory damages and punitive damages for judges and juries separately in both the 2005
sample and the pre-2005 samples. They found mixed evidence of a State Farm effect on judges
and juries. They found that for lower levels of compensatory damages, judges awarded more
punitive damages in 2005 than in the other sample years, while for higher levels of
compensatory damages, judges awarded less punitive damages than in other sample years. They
found an opposite, and less dramatic, difference for juries. Specifically, the authors found that for
compensatory damages up to about $100,000, judges actually awarded more punitive damages
per dollar of compensatory damages in 2005 than in the years before State Farm. Juries, on the
other hand, awarded higher levels of punitive damages per dollar of compensatory damages for
compensatory awards over about $10,000. Additionally, the authors provide locally weighted
scatterplot-smoothing models that are consistent with these results. Eisenberg & Heise, supra
note 37, at 346-51.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 348-53.
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explanation for their results was different unobserved factors driving
the selection of cases for judges and juries. 78
While Eisenberg and Heise addressed some important
questions about the effect State Farm has had on punitive damages
awards, they focused on explaining the effect's relevance to the
difference between how judges and juries behave.79 They did briefly
address the potential effect of State Farm on punitive damages more
generally, but an explicit test for a more general State Farm effect was
not the focus of the authors' work.80 For judges, the authors briefly
mention unreported regression models that tested generally for a
State Farm effect, stating, "Regression models confirm the absence of
a significant effect of a dummy variable for 2005 trials or an
interaction term between this dummy variable and the compensatory
award."81 For juries, the authors briefly mention a similar unreported
regression model that supports the absence of a significant State Farm
effect, explaining, "Regression models, both ordinary least squares
models and multilevel models with local and state as levels, confirm a
highly significant effect (p = 0.001) of a dummy variable for 2005
trials."82
The potential effect of State Farm has assumed a more central
role in the examination of blockbuster awards. Viscusi and Hersch
first defined and identified blockbuster awards in 2004, finding sixtythree punitive damages awards exceeding $100 million between 1985
and 2003.83 Del Rossi and Viscusi later updated this list, identifying
one hundred blockbuster cases decided between 1985 and 2008.84 As
part of this update, Del Rossi and Viscusi examined the possible
determinants of blockbuster punitive damages awards by rigorously
evaluating each one.8 5 The individual case characteristics they
examined included the industry involved in the case, the location of
the case, the type of trial (jury or bench), and the type of litigants
involved.86

78.

Id. For a (separate) thorough empirical analysis of how litigants demand jury trials, see

Joni Hersch, Demand for a Jury Trial and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 119
(2006).
79. See id. at 346-51 (discussing behavioral, educational, and other explanations for the
disparate behavior between judges and juries).
80. Id. at 350.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 55, at 3-6.
84. Del Rossi & Viscusi, supra note 4, at 117.
85. Id. at 116.
86. Id. at 144-47.
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The authors considered how State Farm affected punitive
damages awards controlling for the effects of other potentially
relevant events: the Master Settlement Agreement of the tobacco
litigation of the late 1990s and Engle v. Ligget Group, Inc., 81 which
involved an extremely large punitive damages award.88 In considering
the effects State Farm had on punitive damages awards, they first
compared the mean and median of the ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages from before and after the case and found that
both decreased after the Supreme Court decided State Farm.89
Through empirical analysis, the authors found that State Farm had a
statistically significant negative impact on the number of blockbuster
punitive damages awards.90 They also came to two important
conclusions regarding the effect that State Farm had on the amount of
punitive damages awarded. 9 1 First, while blockbuster punitive
damages had been trending upward in the years leading up to State
Farm as well as in the years after State Farm, the decision eliminated
about three-fourths of the upward trend in punitive damages.92
Second, State Farm changed the way in which the amount of
compensatory damages influenced the amount of punitive damages
awarded. 93 After State Farm, a one percent increase in compensatory
damages was associated with a smaller increase in punitive damages
than before State Farm.94
Taken together, these findings indicate that State Farm had a
significant negative effect on punitive damages in blockbuster cases.95
Del Rossi and Viscusi demonstrated that the State Farm decision had
a negative effect on the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, the
number of cases in which punitive damages were awarded, and the
amount of punitive damages awarded as part of blockbuster awards.96

87. Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So.2d 1246, 1263 (Fla. 2006).
88. Del Rossi & Viscusi, supra note 4, at 133-37.
89. The mean decreased from over seven hundred to about fourteen while the median
decreased from about twelve to two. Id. at 135.
90. Id. at 139-41.
91. Id. at 141-42.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Specifically, Del Rossi and Viscusi estimated that before the State Farm decision, a one
percent increase in compensatory damages was associated with a roughly one percent increase in
punitive damages, but after State Farm, a one percent increase in compensatory damages was
associated with only about a half percent increase in punitive damages. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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The above-mentioned studies are the only empirical
evaluations of the State Farm effect,97 and an important problem is
immediately obvious from their work. A substantial discrepancy exists
between the effect of State Farm on blockbuster and everyday cases.
State Farm has had a significant impact on blockbuster punitive
damages awards,98 but Eisenberg and Heise found that it has not had
the expected impact on everyday awards. 99 Because of this discrepancy
and because the effect of State Farm on everyday awards has never
been explicitly examined, I conduct a new empirical analysis of this
effect on everyday cases.
B. The Data
To examine directly what effect, if any, State Farm has had on
everyday punitive awards, I conduct an empirical analysis that
extends and broadens the analysis conducted by Eisenberg and Heise.
To conduct this analysis, I use the 2001 and 2005 samples from the
Civil Justice Survey of State Courts. The CJSSC is a project of the
Bureau of Justice Statistics and the National Center for State Courts
and provides data on tort, contract, and property cases tried to verdict
in 2001 and 2005.100 The data cover trials in state courts of general
jurisdiction, and the data were collected directly from clerks' offices in
those courts. 10 1 The information from each trial includes the types of
trial (jury or bench), types of litigants involved (individual,
government, business, insurance company, etc.), and the types of
claims by plaintiffs and counterclaims by defendants (motor vehicle
accident, professional malpractice, conversion, fraud, etc.). 0 2 The data
also include the amount of both compensatory and punitive damages

97. There is one more study that only considers cases after State Farm. See generally
Theodore Eisenberg, Michael Heise, Nicole L. Waters & Martin T. Wells, The Decision to Award
Punitive Damages:An Empirical Study, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 577, 578-79 (2010) (relying on data
from a 2005 Bureau of Justice Statistics CJSSC, collected two years after State Farm was
decided).
98. Del Rossi & Viscusi, supra note 4, at 154-55.
99. See generally Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 37, at 325 (presenting evidence that any
shifts in the 2005 CJSSC are not attributable to State Farm).
100. Neither the 2001 sample nor the 2005 sample contains information on cases that were
settled prior to trial. THOMAS H. COHEN & STEVEN K. SMITH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 2001 (2004) [hereinafter BJS 2001],
available at http:/Ibjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ctcvlc0l.pdf; LYNN LANGTON & THOMAS H.
COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CIVIL BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005

(2008) [hereinafter BJS 2005], availableat http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbjtscO5.pdf.
101. BJS 2001, supra note 100, at 1; BJS 2005, supra note 100, at 1.
102. See generally BJS 2001, supra note 100; BJS 2005, supranote 100.
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awarded at each trial. 103 Because trained coders worked directly with
court clerks' offices in collecting damages amounts, these data do not
suffer from problems of overstatement in the same way self-reported
awards may.104
The 2001 sample was collected from a random set of forty-five
of the seventy-five most populous counties in the United States. 05 The
2005 sample was collected from the same set of counties used in the
2001 sample. 06 The 2005 sample also contains a random sample of
110 smaller counties drawn from over three thousand smaller
counties. 0 7 To keep the two samples comparable, the empirical
evaluation below excludes all observations in the 2005 sample from
counties that were not also included in the 2001 sample.108 For 2005,
the included trials represent about thirty percent of all trials in
American state courts.1 09 Throughout the analysis, I report all of the
results and statistics in 2005 dollars. All of the dollar amounts from
the 2001 sample have been inflation adjusted to reflect 2005 dollars
using the Consumer Price Index.1 0
When analyzing the CJSSC data, I focus on the 2001 and 2005
samples to isolate the effects of State Farm on punitive damages
awards."' Limiting the analysis to samples collected two years before
and two years after the State Farm decision minimizes the possibility
that unobservable trends are driving the results."12
103. See generally BJS 2001, supra note 100; BJS 2005, supranote 100.
104. Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 37, at 330; see also BJS 2001, supra note 100, at 11-12
(detailing the sampling methodology); BJS 2005, supra note 100, at 11 (same.
105. BJS 2001, supra note 100, at 11.
106. BJS 2005, supra note 100, at 11.
107. BJS 2005, supra note 100, at 11.
108. This procedure is similar to that found in Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 37, at 336-37.
109. Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 37, at 329. The CJSSC is not a true nationally
representative sample in the sense that it was randomly collected from all trials conducted in the
country for a given year, but the datasets are the closest to being nationally representative that
are currently available. Additionally, because the CJSSC datasets contain information only on
completed trials, the results apply only to judgment amounts, not to settlements. See BJS 2001,
supra note 100, at 11-12 (describing collection of dataset); BJS 2005, supra note 100, at 11
(same).
110. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index, BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/tables.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2013).
111. I take additional measures to mitigate the effect of confounding factors, and those are
described below.
112. For example, the mix of cases appearing before courts will be less likely to change over
four years than over a longer period (using all of the CJSSC samples would involve a mix of cases
brought thirteen years apart). By considering samples two years before and after State Farm, I
also minimize the possibility that shifts occurred in the legal system that would create a false
State Farm effect or obscure a true State Farm effect. One such concern may be tort reform,
which sometimes targets punitive damages. A review of Ronen Avraham's database of state tort
reform indicates that the period between 2001 and 2005 involved few tort reform actions, while
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C. DataAnalysis
Tables 1 and 2 report summary statistics for the 2001 and 2005
samples of the CJSSC for all trials as well as jury trials and bench
trials separately. Table 1 reports statistics for cases decided before
State Farm was binding precedent while Table 2 reports statistics for
cases subject to the State Farm ratio cap. Panel A of both tables
reports basic statistics about the number of trials sampled and the
number of trials involving punitive damages, and in many respects,
the two samples are similar. In both 2001 and 2005, around 7,500
trials were sampled, and about three-fourths of those trials were jury
trials. Plaintiffs' success rates across different trial types and all trials
were also similar across the two years. However, conditional on a
plaintiff winning, courts were slightly less likely to award punitive
damages in 2005 than 2001.
Panel B of both tables presents a basic picture of compensatory
damages across different types of trials, and those results show that
the characteristics of compensatory awards were similar across the
two years. Conditional on compensatory damages being awarded,
juries awarded an average of about three times the amount of
compensatory damages that judges did in each year. However, the
median compensatory award for juries was not even twice as large as
the median compensatory award for judges in each year.
Panel C of both tables reports summary statistics for cases in
which the court awarded punitive damages to at least one plaintiff.
The average amount awarded decreased by about half for all trials
from 2001 to 2005, with judges awarding about $80,000 more and
juries awarding almost $4 million less. These statistics are roughly
consistent with what Eisenberg and Heise found in their more
systematic analysis of judges and juries; although, I compare only
2001 with 2005 as opposed to the aggregate of 1992, 1996, and 2001
with 2005.113 In contrast with the change in the mean award amounts,
the median punitive damages award for all trials increased from 2001
to 2005, and the median amount awarded by judges and juries
decreased and increased respectively. These effects are exactly
opposite from the effects observable in the mean award amounts.
Thus, the raw data on punitive damages amounts do not paint a clear
picture of the effect of State Farm.
the period from 1992 to 2001 involved comparatively more reforms. See generally Ronen
Avraham, Databaseof State Tort Law Reforms (DSTLR 4th) (Univ. of Tex. School of Law, Law &
2011),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
184,
Paper No.
Econ. Research
papers.cfm?abstractid=902711.
113. Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 37, at 346.
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Finally, Panel D of each table reports basic statistics for the
ratio of punitive to compensatory damages. Similar to the statistics for
punitive damages amounts, the mean and median ratios move in
opposite directions from 2001 to 2005. The mean ratio decreases, and
the median ratio increases; although, both the mean and median
remain under the ratio cap imposed by State Farm. Panel D of each
table also reports the number of cases exceeding the single-digit ratio
imposed by State Farm. In both years, this number was less than ten,
but 2005 saw fewer awards violate the ratio limit, and no judges
imposed awards beyond the limit after State Farm was decided.
To determine if State Farm affected the number of awards that
violated the ratio limit, I use a binomial test. This test determines
whether there was a statistically significant difference in the
proportion of awards that violated the single-digit-ratio limit after
State Farm relative to before State Farm. This test is nonparametric,
so it does not rely on any distributional assumptions. Using the
binomial test, I am unable to reject the hypothesis that the proportion
of awards violating the single-digit ratio is the same before and after
State Farm (p = 0.878). In other words, there is no statistical evidence
that State Farm affected the number of awards involving multi-digit
ratios. A chi-squared test and test of proportions confirm the results of
the binomial test.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for the 2001 CJSSC Sample
Jury
Trials

Bench
Trials

All
Trials

Panel A- General Characteristics
5,846

1,947

7,793

75%

25%

100%

Number of Which Plaintiff Won

3,013

1,223

4,236

Percent of Which Plaintiff Won

52%

63%

54%

Number in Which PD Awarded

155

57

212

Percent in Which PD Awarded

5.14%

4.66%

5.00%

757,303

229,408

604,711

5,334,138

1,708,301

4,596,398

44,829

28,718

38,568

3,008

1,223

4,231

7,024,798

186,891

5,186,304

42,000,000

467,888

36,000,000

83,250

56,055

67,155

155

57

212

8.269

2.006

6.544

52.297

5.508

44.657

0.623

0.490

0.622

150

57

207

7

2

9

Number
Percent of Sample

Panel B: Characteristicsof
Compensatory Damages (if CD>0)
(2005 dollars)
Mean
Standard Deviation
Median
Number of Observations
Panel C: Characteristics of Punitive
Damages (if PD>0) (2005 dollars)
Mean
Standard Deviation
Median
Number of Observations
Panel D: Characteristics of PD/CD
Ratio (if PD>0 and CD>0)

Mean
Standard Deviation
Median
Number of Observations
Number Exceeding Single-Digit Ratio

Data Source: Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 2005 Sample. Note that CD =
compensatory damages and PD = punitive damages. Also note that all award amounts are
reported in 2005 dollars.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for the 2005 CJSSC Sample
Jury Trials

Bench
Trials

All Trials

Panel A. General Characteristics
Number

5,454

2,028

7,482

73%

27%

100%

Number of Which Plaintiff Won

2,578

1,272

3,850

Percent of Which Plaintiff Won

47%

63%

51%

Number in Which PD Awarded

118

45

163

Percent in Which PD Awarded

4.58%

3.54%

4.23%

772,045

253,972

600,796

4,875,988

1,870,459

4,138,786

48,000

31,743

40,000

2,566

1,267

3,833

3,118,837

266,055

2,331,259

11,800,000

662,386

10,100,000

187,413

50,000

114,000

118

45

163

Mean

2.646

1.449

2.328

Standard Deviation

4.178

1.414

3.686

Median

1.000

1.000

1.000

116

42

158

Percent of Sample

PanelB: Characteristicsof Compensatory
Damages (if CD>0) (2005 dollars)
Mean
Standard Deviation
Median
Number of Observations
Panel C: Characteristics of Punitive
Damages (if PD>0) (2005 dollars)
Mean
Standard Deviation
Median
Number of Observations
PanelD: CharacteristicsofPD/CD Ratio
(ifPD>0and CD>0)

Number of Observations

Number Exceeding Single-Digit Ratio
6
0
6
DataSource: Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 2001 Sample.
Note that CD = compensatory damages and PD = punitive damages. Note also that all
awards amounts are reported in 2005 dollars.
In the next Section, I employ a detailed regression analysis,

which allows me to control for various factors that may be masking
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the effect of State Farm in the raw data. For example, if intentional
tort cases involve particularly large punitive damages awards (or
particularly large ratios of punitive to compensatory damages) and
courts heard more of these cases in 2001 than 2005, then the mean
punitive damages award may be higher in 2001 because of the larger
number of intentional tort cases rather than the absence of State
Farm's prescribed ratio. Controlling for other factors, like the type of
case, will allow me to isolate the effect of State Farm.
D. Regression Analysis
1. Empirical Motivation
To disentangle the effect of State Farm from other case- and
year-specific factors that may influence award amounts, I use linear
regressions and quantile regressions. The analysis presented here
includes more controls than previous analyses, and those controls act
to truly isolate the effect of State Farm from other case-specific factors
that may influence punitive damages awards. These controls include
the type of case, the type of litigants involved, the type of adjudicator,
and the jurisdiction in which the case is heard. This analysis allows
me to better test my hypothesis about the effect of State Farm because
while it cannot hold "all else equal," it can net out the effect of State
Farm from the effect of the other control variables included in the
analysis.
My regression analysis differs in several important respects
from previous work. First, it includes more control variables than
prior work that has considered State Farm's effect on everyday
awards. 114 Second, it includes different types of variables to test
whether State Farm had an effect on overall punitive damages
amounts and whether State Farm had an effect on the relationship
between punitive and compensatory damages. Eisenberg and Heise
considered the first type of effect but not the second in their analysis
of everyday awards,115 while both types of effects have been considered
for blockbuster awards." 6 My analysis provides a more complete
picture of how State Farm affected everyday awards. Third, my
analysis includes only the samples of the CJSSC two years before and
after State Farm was decided to mitigate concerns that unobservable
114. Eisenberg and Heise do examine the effect of State Farm with regression models, but
they do not indicate that they used any control variables when examining this effect. See id. at
350.
115. Id.
116. Del Rossi & Viscusi, supra note 4, at 141.
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trends are driving any results, which was one of Eisenberg and Heise's
explanations for their results." 7 While the regression analysis can
control for many case-specific factors, it cannot completely isolate the
effect of State Farm from all factors. Using only data that brackets the
decision by two years mollifies the impact of unobservable trends
(such as the changing influence of plaintiffs' bars), which may
influence the results but are very difficult to measure and control for.
Finally, I employ quantile regressions as well as linear regressions in
my analysis because previous work, as well as the data analysis
presented above, has suggested that the mean and median award
8 While
amounts present mixed evidence of the effect of State Farm."1
quantile regressions have been used to evaluate the effect of State
Farm on blockbuster awards, they have not been used to examine that
effect for everyday awards. Thus my analysis fills in this gap and
provides more comparability across the studies that have considered
everyday awards and those that have considered blockbuster awards.
I use the following general specification throughout my
analysis:119
PDi = a + 0State Farmi + Sjury + y log(CDi) + fiX, + <pW + wZ, +

E

In this equation, PD, the dependent variable, assumes different
values for different measures of punitive damages. First, it takes on
the value of the natural logarithm of punitive damages. 120 This
measure allows me to isolate the effect of State Farm on the amount of
punitive damages awarded. Second, PD takes on the value of the ratio
of punitive to compensatory damages, which allows me to examine the
effect State Farm has had on the actual limitation that it created.

117. Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 37, at 348-53.
118. Eisenberg and Heise noted that the mean and median ratios evidenced a different
impact of State Farm, as the mean ratio decreased but the median ratio increased. Id. at 347-48.
119. This specification is similar to that previous work. See Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 55,
at 17-21.
120. Using the logarithm instead of the actual amount of punitive damages is consistent
with prior research. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 37 (using the natural logarithm of
punitive damages); Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 55 (same). Using the same measure as prior
work facilitates the comparison of findings across studies. In general, previous authors have
chosen the logarithmic form of punitive damages because of its distributional properties. The
distribution of punitive award amounts is skewed, and prior work has been unable to reject the
hypothesis that the logarithm of punitive damages is normally distributed. See Hersch & Viscusi,
supra note 55, at 24 (discussing their choice of the logarithmic form). I employ the same
technique as prior work when dealing with cases involving zero compensatory or punitive
damages. The logarithm of zero does not exist, so I add one to all damages awards and then
calculate the logarithm. See Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 55, at 14.
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State Farm is the variable of interest, and it also assumes two
different values. First, it is an indicator variable that takes on a value
of one if a case was heard after State Farm was binding precedent,
and zero otherwise. Essentially, this is an indicator variable for
whether the case was heard in 2005, and it captures whether State
Farm caused an increase or decrease in the dependent variable.
Second, State Farm is an interaction term between the indicator
variable for whether the case was heard after State Farm was decided
and the logarithm of compensatory damages. This form of the State
Farm variable captures the influence of State Farm on the
relationship between punitive and compensatory damages. The
coefficient of interest in all specifications is 0, which is an estimate of
the effect State Farm had on the relevant punitive damages measure.
Each of the other variables controlled for in the regressions are
case-specific variables which may have an effect on punitive damages
independent of State Farm. Jury is an indicator variable for whether a
jury or a judge made the award and takes on a value of one when a
jury decided the case, and zero otherwise. Log(CD) is the natural log of
compensatory damages. 121 X is a vector of two indicator variables for
the types of litigants involved: one indicator variable takes a value of
one when the case involves an individual versus another individual,
and the second indicator variable takes on a value of one when the
case involves an individual against a hospital, corporation, or
government. W is a vector of indicator variables for different counties
that had multiple punitive damages awards. 122 Finally, Z is a vector of
indicator variables for different types of claims (such as intentional
torts or professional malpractice), and i indexes each case. 123
This general specification isolates the effect of State Farm from
the effect of the other variables. These controls allow me to examine
the effect of State Farm on cases with similar characteristics, and as a
result, the coefficient on State Farm represents the actual effect of
121. Consistent with prior work, I add one to all damages awards prior to calculating the
logarithm. See id.
122. The vector includes indicator variables for the following counties: Alameda, Los
Angeles, and Orange counties in California; Fairfax County in Virginia; Franklin County in
Ohio; Maricopa County in Arizona; and Harris and Dallas counties in Texas. I include these
specific counties because, across both samples, they had the greatest number of punitive
damages awards. This procedure is similar to the procedure used by Professors Hersch and
Viscusi. Id. at 17-21.
123. Indicator variables for the following types of cases are included in Z: premises liability;
intentional tort; professional (including medical and dental) malpractice; slander, libel, or
defamation; negligence; fraud; breach of contract (either buyer or seller breach); employment
dispute or discrimination; contract disputes involving mortgage foreclosure, rental disputes, or
other contractual disputes; and real property disputes. Again, this procedure is consistent with
the approach of Hersch and Viscusi. Id.
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State Farm and not the effect of the other case-specific variables that I
am able to control for and that may be correlated with State Farm.For
example, if the particular jurisdictions changed how they awarded
punitive damages between 2001 and 2005, the conclusions drawn from
the raw data may erroneously attribute the effect of these changes to
State Farm. However, the regressions described above isolate the
effect of the State Farm decision, netting out the effects of the case
attributes discussed above.
2. Results
Table 3 reports the results of ordinary least squares ("OLS")
regressions with the natural logarithm of punitive damages as the
dependent variable. Columns 1 and 2 report the results of regressions
in which the variable of interest is an indicator variable for whether
the award was imposed after State Farm. The regression reported in
Column 1 omits most of the control variables discussed above, and the
regression in Column 2 includes all of the control variables. In the
interest of conciseness, all of the results tables report only the
estimates for the variable of interest and the control variables for
compensatory damages and jury trials. The tables omit the estimates
for all other control variables but indicate when those control
variables were included in the reported regression results.
The regression results in Columns 1 and 2 indicate that State
Farm did not have a negative effect on the amount of punitive
damages awarded by state courts. In both the regression with controls
and the one without controls, State Farm is actually associated with
an increase in award amounts; however, this effect is only statistically
significant in the regression that does not control for other case
attributes. 124 In the regression without additional controls, the
coefficient estimate on the State Farm variable indicates that State
Farm was associated with about an 80% increase in punitive
damages.125 In the regression reported in Column 2, the coefficient
estimate on the State Farm variable indicates that the decision was
associated with about a 53% increase in punitive damages; however,

124. Because the State Farm variable is an indicator variable and the dependent variable is
in logarithmic form, the coefficient reported in Table 3 is not the actual effect of State Farm on
punitive damages awards. To find the actual effect, the coefficient must be transformed using the
formula: exp(O) - 1 (where e is the relevant coefficient). Robert Halvorsen & Raymond Palmquist,
The Interpretationof Dummy Variables in Semilogarithmic Equations, 70 Am. ECON. REV. 474,
474-75 (1980).
125. Using the formula described above, exp(. 588) - 1 = .800 or 80%.
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this coefficient is insignificant.126 The coefficient estimates on the
compensatory damages and jury trial variables are positive and
significant, which is consistent with the existing literature.127 These
two regression models provide some evidence that State Farm had a
positive effect on punitive damages generally, but they do not directly
address the relationship between compensatory and punitive
damages, which is what the holding in State Farm actually addressed.
To examine this relationship, I estimate models with an interaction
term between the compensatory damages variable and the State Farm
variable.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 report the results of two
regressions with this interaction term included. In both the
regressions with all controls and the regressions without all control
variables included, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term is
positive and significant, indicating that State Farm did change the
relationship between compensatory and punitive damages, but in the
opposite way of what was expected. The results in Column 4 indicate
that prior to State Farm, the elasticity between compensatory and
punitive damages was .448 (the estimated coefficient on the logarithm
of compensatory damages),128 which means that a 1% increase in
compensatory damages was associated with about a .448% increase in
punitive damages. In general, a measure of elasticity captures how a
percentage change in one variable (here, compensatory damages)
affects another variable (here, punitive damages). Adding the
coefficient on the interaction term to the coefficient on the logarithm of
compensatory damages gives the estimated elasticity between
compensatory and punitive damages after State Farm, which is .4874.
Therefore, after State Farm, a 1% increase in compensatory damages
is associated with about a .487% increase in punitive damages. In
other words, State Farm is associated with about an 8.8% increase in
the elasticity between compensatory and punitive damages.129 Overall,
the evidence provides no support for the assertion that State Farm
126. Using the formula described above, exp(. 423) - 1 .526 or 53%.
127. Because for the logarithm of compensatory damages both the dependent and
independent variables involve logarithmic transformations, the coefficient here is interpreted as
an elasticity. In the simple regression, for example, the elasticity is 0.519, meaning that a 1%
increase in compensatory damages is associated with a 0.519% increase in punitive damages.
This result is comparable with prior studies. See, e.g., Del Rossi & Viscusi, supra note 4, at 142
(showing an elasticity in the range of 0.5-0.6); Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 37, at 343, 354
(finding an elasticity of about 0.8).
128. The estimated coefficient on the compensatory damages variable is interpreted as an
elasticity because this variable and the dependent variable are both in logarithmic form. Del
Rossi & Viscusi, supra note 4, at 142.
129. This percentage increase is calculated as follows: .448 =
=.087946 or about 8.8%.
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caused a decrease in punitive damages amounts. On the contrary, the
results from the OLS regression models suggest that State Farm is
actually associated with an increase in the elasticity between
compensatory and punitive damages, which is exactly the opposite
effect from the one the Court would likely have expected it to have.
Table 3: The Effect of State Farm on Punitive Damages Awards
Variables

log(CD)
State Farm

(2)

(1)

OLS
0.519**
(0.0743)
0.588**
(0.221)

OLS
0.465**
(0.0736)
0.423
(0.258)

log(CD)xState Farm
Jury

(3)

(4)

OLS

OLS

0.495**
(0.0761)

0.448**
(0.0742)

0.0529**
(0.0169)
0.476*
(0.231)
no

0.0394*
(0.0200)
0.596*
(0.260)
yes

0.495*
(0.230)
no

0.614*
(0.261)
yes

County Controls

no

yes

no

yes

Case-Type Controls

no

yes

no

yes

Litigant-Pair Controls

Number of Observations
375
375
375
375
DataSource: Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 2001and 2005 Samples.
Notes: These results are for OLS regressions. The dependent variable in all specifications
is the natural logarithm of punitive damages. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. The sample is composed of jury and bench trials won by plaintiffs. *, **
indicate significance at the 5% and 1%levels, respectively.
Table 4 reports the results of quantile regressions with the
logarithm of punitive damages as the dependent variable. Similar to
Table 3, the first two columns report results with an indicator variable
for State Farm included and the last two columns report results with
an interaction term between that variable and the logarithm of
compensatory damages included. I estimate quantile regressions for
several reasons. First, previous work and the data analysis above
demonstrate that the mean and median punitive damages award
before and after State Farm suggest different effects of State Farm.130

130. Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 37, at 347-48.
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OLS regressions estimate the conditional mean of a variable while
quantile regressions estimate the conditional median. 13 1 Because State
Farm appears to have had a different effect on the mean and median
punitive damages award, quantile regressions help provide a more
comprehensive picture of the relationship between variables. 132
Second, because prior research has demonstrated that punitive
damages tend to follow distributions with a number of outliers,
quantile regressions at the median can provide additional evidence
that any positive shift in punitive damages observed after State Farm
is a meaningful change in behavior and not simply the result of a few
large awards influencing the OLS coefficients. Because quantile
regressions focus on the conditional median and not the conditional
mean like OLS regressions, they can confirm that outliers are not
driving the results and that the shift in punitive damages after State
Farm occurred near the middle of the distribution of awards and not
just at the higher end. This confirmation is particularly important
given that the results demonstrate an unintended consequence of the
Supreme Court decision. Before recommending a solution to this
unintended consequence, I need to ensure that these consequences do
exist and are affecting award levels in the middle of the distribution.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 report the results of quantile
regressions that include an estimate of State Farm's effect on punitive
damages awards. Similar to the OLS results, the estimates on the
State Farm indicator variable are positive in both columns, and both
are statistically significant. The estimates are roughly consistent with
the OLS estimates, and State Farm is associated with a meaningful
increase in punitive damages awards. Because these results are
derived from estimating the conditional median, they indicate that a
few large awards are not driving the increase in punitive damages
awards associated with State Farm. In other words, these results
indicate that State Farm is associated with an increase in awards near
the middle of the distribution of awards and not just in the largest
awards.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 report the results of quantile
regressions that include an interaction term between the State Farm
indicator variable and the compensatory damages variable. Similar to
the results of the OLS regressions, State Farm is associated with an
increase in the influence of compensatory damages on punitive
131. Quantile regressions can estimate other conditional quantiles, but throughout my
analysis, I only consider the conditional median.
132. See generally Roger Koenker & Kevin F. Hallock, Quantile Regression, 15 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 143 (2001) (describing the usefulness of quantile regressions in elucidating the
relationships between variables).
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damages. This increase of about 8.4% is consistent with the increase
observed in the OLS results. Overall, the results in Table 4 suggest
that State Farm led to larger punitive damages awards both in
absolute terms and relative to a given increase in compensatory
damages. Therefore, no evidence supports the hypothesis that State
Farm reduces either overall punitive damages amounts or the
influence of compensatory damages on punitive damages. On the
contrary, the results support the conclusion that State Farm had the
unexpected consequence of increasing punitive damages awards.
However, State Farm did not deal directly with the amount of punitive
damages but with the ratio of those damages to compensatory
damages. Therefore, the next part of the analysis considers the effect
of State Farm on the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages.
Table 4: The Effect of State Farm on Punitive Damages Awards
Variables

(1)

Quantile

(2)

Quantile

log(CD)

0.708**
(0.0358)

0.634**
(0.0353)

State Farm

0.525*
(0.223)

0.633**
(0.229)

log(CD)xState Farm
Jury

(3)

(4)

Quantile

Quantile

0.688**
(0.0395)

0.618**
(0.0518)

0.0448*
(0.0202)
0.426
(0.269)
no

0.0520+
(0.0279)
0.530
(0.350)
yes

0.568*
(0.249)
no

0.566*
(0.245)
yes

County Controls

no

yes

no

yes

Case-Type Controls

no

yes

no

yes

Litigant-Pair Controls

Number of Observations
375
375
375
375
Data Source: Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 200 land 2005 Samples.
Notes: These results are for quantile regressions. The dependent variable in all
specifications is the natural logarithm of punitive damages. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. The sample is composed of jury and bench trials won by
plaintiffs. +, *, ** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%levels, respectively.

Table 5 reports the results of OLS and quantile regressions
with the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages as the dependent
variable. In all of the reported specifications, the logarithm of

992

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:3:961

compensatory damages is included as a control variable. This creates a
problem of endogeneity bias because the logarithm of compensatory
damages will be correlated with the error term in the regression. I
include the compensatory damages variable primarily to maintain
comparability with the results of Eisenberg and Heise, but it is
important to note that Del Rossi and Viscusi did not include a variable
for compensatory damages when they analyzed the ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages for blockbuster awards. 133 I confirm in
unreported regressions that the qualitative results are not different
when the compensatory damages variable is excluded.
The first two columns of Table 5 report the results of OLS
regressions. The estimate of the coefficient on the State Farm variable
is insignificant in both of these columns, meaning that State Farm has
not had a significant impact on the amount of punitive damages
awarded; however, the estimate of the State Farm effect is negative.
When the compensatory damages variable is excluded, the effect of
State Farm remains negative and insignificant with a slight change in
the magnitude of the estimates. None of the results in the first two
columns support the hypothesis that State Farm decreased the ratio of
punitive to compensatory damages, but unlike prior results, these
results do not provide evidence of unintended consequences in the
form of higher ratios after State Farm.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 report the results of quantile
regressions, and unlike Columns 1 and 2, these results do provide
evidence that State Farm generated unintended consequences in the
form of higher ratios. With and without additional controls, the
estimate of the coefficient on the State Farm variable is positive and
significant, indicating that State Farm is associated with a significant
increase in ratios. These results do not change when the compensatory
damages variable is excluded. These results provide the strongest
evidence of unintended consequences stemming from State Farm. If
lower courts followed the Supreme Court's guidance, they would have
lowered all ratios greater than ten to a lower number. However, none
of the awards with ratios below ten should have been affected, and
they certainly should not have risen if lower courts implemented State
Farm without changing the way they imposed punitive damages
awards otherwise. The fact that the conditional median is significantly
and positively impacted by State Farm suggests that lower courts did
not simply implement State Farm to reduce multi-digit ratios but
133. See Del Rossi & Viscusi, supra note 4, at 152 (excluding the compensatory damages
variable); Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 37, at 356 (including the compensatory damages
variable).
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changed how they impose awards in other ways so that the ratio of
punitive to compensatory damages actually increased after State
Farm.
Table 5: The Effect of State Farm on the Ratio of Punitive to
Compensatory Damages

Variables
log(CD)
State Farm
Jury
Litigant-Pair Controls

(1)
OLS

(2)
OLS

-4.236+
(2.393)
-3.039
(2.399)
7.422+
(4.225)
no

-3.586+
(1.879)
-3.579
(2.948)
6.941+
(3.909)
yes

(3)
Quantile
-0.115**
(0.0278)
0.400**
(0.140)
0.149
(0.157)
no

(4)
Quantile
-0.133**
(0.0183)
0.484**
(0.0919)
0.0559
(0.100)
yes

County Controls

no

yes

no

yes

Case-Type Controls

no

yes

no

yes

Number of Observations
365
365
365
365
Data Source: Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 2001 and 2005 Samples.
Notes: The dependent variable in all specifications is the ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The sample is
composed of jury and bench trials won by plaintiffs involving positive compensatory and
punitive damages. The first two columns report results for OLS regressions, and the
second two columns report results for quantile regressions. Ten observations are dropped
in the results of this table because they involved zero compensatory damages.
Compensatory damages must be positive for the ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages to exist. +, *

**

indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,

respectively.
E. An Ineffective Doctrine with Unintended Consequences
Collectively, the empirical evidence above demonstrates that
State Farm has not had the effect one would expect it to have and
suggests that it has actually caused some unintended effects. The
evidence provides no support for the assertion that State Farm has
effectively lowered either the amount of punitive damages or the ratio
of punitive to compensatory damages. On the contrary, evidence
suggests that State Farm is associated with an increase in the
medians of both of those measures for everyday awards.
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However, the evidence above pertains only to everyday
punitive damages awards and looks very different than the evidence
for blockbuster punitive damages awards. Contrary to that for
everyday awards, the evidence for blockbuster awards suggests that
State Farm had a negative effect on punitive damages. 134 In other
words, the effect of State Farm is inconsistent across different sizes of
awards. The inconsistent effect of a Supreme Court decision would be
troubling in any context, but in the context of punitive damages, it is
particularly troubling. From the beginning of its punitive damages
jurisprudence, the Court identified predictability (or lack of notice to
defendants) as the primary problem it was seeking to address. 35
Under the current ratio cap, defendants will still likely have difficulty
predicting the amount of liability they may face; moreover, they will
have little idea how much protection, if any, they will receive from
State Farm since that decision seems to have affected blockbuster and
everyday awards very differently. In other words, when the Court
attempted to make punitive damages awards more predictable in Gore
and State Farm, it actually introduced another layer of
unpredictability for defendants, compounding the problem it originally
sought to address. Before State Farm, defendants attempted to predict
their punitive liability, but now they must predict that liability as well
as the likelihood they will face liability high enough for State Farm to
offer some protection. Therefore, the current limitations on punitive
damages could be characterized as inconsistent, ineffective, or
ambiguous depending on how one views the cases before courts today,
but certainly these limitations have generated problems that did not
exist before in the form of less predictability and increased awards (for
everyday awards).
One possible explanation for the increase in everyday awards
after State Farm is anchoring. Several studies have evaluated the
effects of imposing caps on damages and found that individuals
awarding damages anchor to the amount of the cap and that this
anchor can increase their final award amount relative to what it
would have been without the cap in place.136 While State Farm did not
impose an actual cap, it did impose a limitation which individuals
could easily calculate and then use as an anchor when determining a
punitive damages award. For example, if a jury determined that a

134. Del Rossi & Viscusi, supranote 4, at 142.
135. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416-18 (2003).
136. For a general review of how individuals exhibit anchoring behavior when damages caps
are imposed, see Jennifer K. Robbennolt, DeterminingPunitive Damages: EmpiricalInsights and
Implicationsfor Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103 (2002).
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plaintiff deserved $100,000 in compensatory damages, it could easily
calculate that $1 million would be the effective cap on p'unitive
damages under State Farm's single-digit-ratio limit. Thus, the jury
would have a cap on which to anchor when determining punitive
damages and which could serve to increase its final punitive damages
award. This cap may be particularly important in the context of
punitive damages since juries generally receive no specific guidance on
how to set awards,137 meaning they may be drawn to the cap as a
useful anchor.
Instead of anchoring, another possible explanation is that
adjudicators simply perceived State Farm as permission to increase
punitive damages awards as long as those awards do not violate the
ratio cap. Before State Farm, adjudicators may have wanted to award
higher levels of punitive damages but feared those awards would
violate the holdings of Gore or other cases. However, after State Farm,
they know how large they can make their awards before violating the
due process rights of the defendant. As a result, the adjudicators could
increase awards from what they awarded previously while remaining
under the ratio cap. In other words, adjudicators may not have been
anchoring to any specific amount, but may have felt that the Court
had implicitly given them permission to raise their awards.
Whether anchoring, receiving implicit permission, or a
different unintended consequence caused the effect, the evidence
suggests that State Farm is associated with a significant increase in
the size of punitive damages awards and the ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages. However, the analysis above cannot
completely rule out that some factor other than State Farm caused the
increase. I control for as many case-specific factors as possible, but
other unobservable changes may still have caused the increase in
awards. However, these changes would need to have been pervasive;
they would need to have affected a number of courts across the United
States in a similar way since the CJSSC surveyed state courts across
the country. It is unlikely that something other than a universally
binding decision by the Supreme Court of the United States could
have this effect, but I cannot rule out all other causes with complete
certainty.
Below, I propose a new framework to limit punitive damages,
but before doing so, I use the next Part to briefly outline some
additional inconsistencies and problems with the current doctrine,
beyond its unintended consequences. Understanding why the current
doctrine is inconsistent will assist in constructing a new doctrine that
137. Del Rossi & Viscusi, supra note 4, at 117.
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avoids past mistakes and effectively limits punitive damages in a
manner consistent with how the Supreme Court has applied the Due
Process Clause in this area of constitutional jurisprudence.
IV. IDENTIFYING ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS WITH THE PUNITIVE DAMAGES
DOCTRINE
In addition to causing unintended consequences, the doctrine
behind State Farm suffers from three other problems. These three
problems almost certainly contribute to the ineffectiveness of State
Farm demonstrated by my regression analysis, but they stand alone
as independent problems as well. I discuss these problems here not to
explain State Farm's ineffectiveness, but to demonstrate that the
current constitutional doctrine on punitive damages suffers from other
problems independent of any effect it may have on punitive damages
awards themselves. First, the State Farm ratio cap undermines the
Supreme Court's deterrence justification for punitive damages because
it mathematically prevents courts from achieving optimal deterrence.
Second, even if the doctrine were logically consistent,
implementing optimal deterrence through juries (which, as
demonstrated by Tables 1 and 2, award a substantial proportion of
punitive damages) would likely prove nearly impossible. 138 Third,
while the Court has held that reprehensibility is the most important
factor in determining the reasonableness of an award, juries have
significant difficulty in actually translating a determination of
reprehensibility into a monetary award. Essentially, the second and
third problems imply that juries cannot effectively implement the
goals of deterring wrongful conduct and punishing reprehensible
actions through punitive damages. These three issues taken together
demonstrate that the current constitutional doctrine is flawed and
incapable of effectively ensuring that punitive damages awards are
predictable and that defendants receive adequate notice of their
potential liability.
A. Internal Logical Inconsistency
Under the Due Process Clause, the Court has held that
deterrence is one of the fundamental justifications of punitive
damages.1 39 Returning to the basic framework of deterrence theory

138. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REID HASTIE, JOHN W. PAYNE, DAVID A. SCHKADE & W. KIP Viscusi,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE 29-61 (2002).
139. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 408; BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 567 (1996).
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described in Part II.B, the amount of punitive damages that induces
optimal care and provides optimal deterrence is given by the following
equation: 140
PD =

1

P)

* CD

The optimal amount of punitive damages is completely determined by
the amount of compensatory damages multiplied by what is termed

the liability ratio:

( ).

Using this equation for punitive damages, it is possible to
examine the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages that was the
focus of the virtual cap established by State Farm.141 The ratio to
which State Farm referred is equivalent to the liability ratio, and this
can be seen by rearranging the equation above to isolate the ratio of
punitive to compensatory damages (PD/CD) on one side and the
liability ratio on the other. The following equation demonstrates that
the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is exactly equivalent to
the liability ratio:
PD 1 - p
CD
p
Thus, by simply rearranging the equation that determines the
optimal amount of punitive damages, one can solve for the very ratio
that State Farm sought to limit. This equation demonstrates that the
optimal ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is exactly
equivalent to the liability ratio. In other words, by placing a limitation
on the ratio, State Farm implicitly placed a limitation on the liability
ratio. 142 This limitation thus presents a fundamental problem because
there is absolutely no guarantee that the liability ratio will assume a
value less than ten. 143 Moreover, under deterrence theory, the liability
ratio must be able to assume any value in order to achieve optimal
deterrence. 144 When the liability ratio is arbitrarily limited to less

140. The full analysis and derivation of this equation is presented supra Section II.B.
141. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425.
142. Id.
143. Because the probability of being held liable, as well as the probability of escaping
liability, can take on any value between zero and one, deterrence theory requires a liability ratio
that varies from zero to infinity.
144. SHAVELL, supra note 6, at 243-47.
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than ten in the manner the Court required in State Farm, optimal
deterrence becomes a mathematical impossibility.14
Returning to the example used to illustrate deterrence in Part
II.B: The defendant faced a 50% chance of being held liable for the
harm it caused, which inflicted damages of $100. By adding $100 in
punitive damages to the $100 in compensatory damages, the
defendant internalized the full cost of its actions and took optimal
precautions against inflicting the harm in the first place. In this
example, the equation relating the ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages to the liability ratio was:
$100

.5

$100

.5

In the above case, the liability ratio is equal to one, clearly
under the State Farm ratio cap. However, suppose that instead of
facing a 50% chance of being held liable, the defendant faces a 5%
chance of being held liable. This would imply a liability ratio of '9.5
which simplifies to nineteen; this means that to achieve optimal
deterrence, the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages would also
need to be nineteen. The problem here is that nineteen clearly exceeds
the single-digit ratio cap imposed by State Farm. In other words, a
lower court could never achieve optimal deterrence in this example. In
fact, any defendant that faces less than a

chance of being held liable

can never be optimally deterred under the State Farm ratio cap.146
Therefore, by limiting the liability ratio to less than ten, the
Court implicitly held that under the Fourteenth Amendment, courts
are prohibited from achieving optimal deterrence in many situations,
despite the fact that the Court has reiterated throughout its punitive
damages jurisprudence that deterrence is one of the primary goals of
punitive damages.147 The Court claimed it based its ratio on past
experience with punitive damages rather than any mathematical
145. More formally, the liability ratio

- can take on any value between zero and infinity

(x-p)
E [0, oo). As the probability of being held liable becomes very small, the liability ratio
P
= m. As a result, by
becomes very large so that (with a slight abuse of notation) limp-0.o (
so that

artificially limiting this ratio to less than ten, the liability ratio cannot become large enough to
achieve optimal deterrence when the probability of being held liable becomes very small.
146. Formally, any probability of being held liable, p, that satisfies the following inequality
will necessarily result in a ratio of punitive to compensatory damages that violates the State
Solving this equation yields p < .
Farm cap: 10 < (.
147. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425; BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 567 (1996).
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considerations. 148 However, by ignoring the mathematical
considerations, the Court handicapped lower courts attempting to
implement the Court's directive that punitive damages should deter
defendants. Perhaps the Court made an unstated assumption that
providing defendants with notice was more important than achieving
deterrence, but without a decision to that effect, and in light of the
Court's strong emphasis on the goal of deterrence, the current doctrine
remains logically inconsistent.
The above analysis does assume that the Court intended to
implement a system that achieved optimal deterrence, but this
assumption appears well-founded. A system that achieved any other
level of deterrence would be, by definition, inefficient, and it is
exceedingly unlikely that the Court intended to implement a level of
deterrence other than optimal deterrence-if it did, it provided no
criteria to determine this other level of deterrence. Of course, the
Court may have intended that the goals of deterrence and retribution
be implemented together, but it has never stated how those goals
should interact or that the goal of retribution should trump the
implementation of the optimal level of deterrence.
The logical inconsistency in the Court's current framework is
interesting for its. legal significance and demonstrates that the Court
has not adequately considered all aspects of that framework, but
ultimately, the fact that the current framework is inconsistent may
not matter. In the next Section, I discuss why implementing any level
of deterrence will likely prove impossible as long as juries are
involved.
B. Juries Cannot Implement Deterrence
Assuming that the Court sought to implement a specific level of
deterrence, optimal or otherwise, the Court's goal will likely never be
achieved because juries have trouble translating their judgments of
liability and blameworthiness into award amounts that achieve a
specific level of deterrence. 149 Scholars have suggested implementing a
limit on punitive damages that directly achieves optimal deterrence. 15 0
Polinsky and Shavell offered a set of specific jury instructions
designed to encourage juries to achieve optimal deterrence; it directs a
jury to consider, in setting the punitive damages award, the
probability that a defendant would be held liable for the harm it
148. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425.
149. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supranote 138, at 142-70.
150. Id.
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caused. 15 1Though these instructions were posed in the abstract, prior
to State Farm,152 the Court has noted both before and after State Farm
that increasing punitive damages is warranted when the wrongful
conduct is difficult to detect.15a However, experimental evidence
suggests that instituting jury instructions to achieve optimal
deterrence would not succeed.154
Viscusi explicitly tested the instructions written by Polinsky
and Shavell by presenting mock jurors with scenarios in which a
defendant was held liable with some probability. 155 The mock jurors
were given tables to aid them with the probability calculations
necessary to arrive at the optimal punitive damages award; even with
these aids and explicit instructions to do so, they did not award the
optimal level of punitive damages. 56 Instead, Viscusi found that jury
awards were not sensitive to changes in the probability that the
defendant would be caught; furthermore, the awards suffered from the
same unpredictability with the Polinksy and Shavell instructions as
under more traditional regimes. 57
Based on this evidence, the fact that the Supreme Court's
current doctrine on punitive damages with respect to deterrence is
logically inconsistent may not matter that much. If juries (which, as
demonstrated in Tables 1 and 2, are responsible for a substantial
percentage of punitive damages awards) cannot effectively implement
optimal deterrence, then a limit on their discretion to achieve optimal
deterrence may be relatively meaningless. However, that arbitrary
limit will likely prove more salient for judges awarding punitive
damages. Viscusi, in a separate experimental study, concludes that
judges are more capable of the types of analyses and calculations
necessary to achieve optimal deterrence.s58 If judges are capable of
implementing optimal deterrence, then the arbitrary limit of the State
Farm cap would affect their ability to do so in the cases in which they
directly award punitive damages and would also affect their ability to

151. Those instructions are too long to reproduce here. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note
48, at 957-61 (describing jury instructions designed to achieve optimal deterrence).
152. However, these instructions were not used in an actual case.
153. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 494-95 (2008) ("[H]eavier punitive awards
have been thought to be justifiable when wrongdoing is hard to detect . . ."); BMW of N. Am.,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996) ("A higher ratio may also be justified in cases in which the
injury is hard to detect .... .").
154. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supranote 138, at 142-70.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 142-70, 186-207.
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"correct" jury awards through post-trial motions and the appellate
process.
C. Juries Cannot Translate Reprehensibility into a Monetary Award
Under the Due Process Clause, the reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct is the most important determinant of the
reasonableness of punitive damages, and the Court has held that
punitive damages awards should be calibrated to the "reprehensibility
of the defendant's conduct." 59 However, the Court has never provided
clear guidance on how courts should tailor the amount of punitive
damages to the reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct. This lack of
guidance is an important failure because juries generally agree on the
reprehensibility of a given act but cannot effectively translate that
agreement into a dollar amount.160

Specifically, research has demonstrated that jurors are quite
consistent in judging the moral reprehensibility of different wrongful
acts and generally agree on the relative ranking of which harmful acts
are more reprehensible than others.161 However, despite this general
consensus on the relative reprehensibility of different acts, jurors are
notoriously bad at translating this consensus into dollar awards. 162
Individual jurors can arrive at very different dollar amounts for acts
they agree are equally reprehensible, and moreover, experimental
evidence indicates that jury deliberations can actually shift the final
punitive award to a level much higher than the median juror award.163
Naturally, this process creates substantial unpredictability in punitive
damages.164
Therefore, using reprehensibility as the primary factor for
determining the reasonableness of a given punitive damages award
presents a fundamental problem: the award amount will likely never
reflect the actual reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct.
Certainly, courts can recognize the unpredictability of jury awards
and "correct" those awards sua sponte, on a post-trial motion or on
appeal. However, while the evidence suggests that judges may impose
more predictable awards, 165 there is no guarantee that these awards
159. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 409 (2003); BMW of N. Am.,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 567 (1996).
160. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 138, at 29-61.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 44.
165. Id. at 142-70, 186-207.
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will be, on the whole, reflective of the actual reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct. Additionally, Eisenberg and Heise suggest that
judges may actually be worse at heeding the guidance of the Supreme
Court in the area of punitive damages.1 66 This means that while
judges are superior to jurors in the types of analyses and calculations
needed to arrive at reasonable damages awards, there are reasons to
doubt that they could effectively implement the Supreme Court's
guidance on punitive damages.
In terms of the empirical results presented above, if jurors are
simply incapable of implementing deterrence or arriving at an award
consistent with a given level of reprehensibility, then the
ineffectiveness of State Farm is not surprising. When a court instructs
a jury to award a punitive damages amount to achieve the goals of
deterrence and retribution (by punishing reprehensible acts), research
clearly demonstrates they will be unable to do so. Therefore, a decision
that puts additional constraints on a jury will likely prove relatively
meaningless since jurors do not appear to be capable of
implementation in the first place. Additionally, if judges are not
willing to heed the directives of the Supreme Court in the area of
punitive damages, as Eisenberg and Heise suggest, then they will not
provide a meaningful check on jury awards that are inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's emphasis on reprehensibility.
To combat the inability of juries to arrive at consistent punitive
awards, I propose a new framework below that removes the discretion
of juries (and judges) to set whatever award amount they wish and
provides them with a concrete point from which to set awards. I
propose this new framework, which is fairly general in nature, as a
practical solution that can be implemented immediately even if it does
not solve all of the problems associated with punitive damages.
V. TOWARD A FEASIBLE SOLUTION
The current constitutional doctrine governing punitive
damages is flawed. The ratio limit imposed by State Farm has not
reduced everyday punitive damages awards, and' the evidence
suggests it has actually increased them. The current doctrine is also
internally inconsistent and effectively undermines one of the primary
goals of punitive damages by preventing courts from achieving optimal
deterrence. Even if the current doctrine were internally consistent,
research suggests that juries are underequipped to actually
implement the doctrine to achieve the two primary goals of deterrence
166. Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 37, at 346-51.
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and retribution. In this Part, I propose a new solution that allows
lower courts to better achieve the original goals articulated in Gore
and State Farm-providing defendants with fair notice and increasing
the predictability of punitive damages167-and mitigates the current
problems with achieving deterrence and retribution.
In the next case concerning punitive damages that comes
before the Court, the Court should abandon its current doctrine and
establish a new framework that simplifies the determination of
punitive damages and provides adjudicators with a concrete point of
comparison to set awards that better achieve deterrence and
retribution while remaining predictable. To do this, the Court should
abandon the current three guideposts from Gore, augmented by the
ratio cap from State Farm, and require that punitive damages be
awarded as part of a two-part test in order to satisfy due process.
First, the relevant adjudicator (whether judge or jury) should
determine whether the defendant's conduct is sufficiently
reprehensible to warrant punitive damages. Second, if the court
determines punitive damages are warranted, the court should set the
actual award using only the third guidepost from Gore: "the difference
between [the] remedy and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in
comparable cases." 168 This new framework achieves the goals of
deterrence and retribution with a simpler system, and it avoids the
problems of asking adjudicators to translate their desire for
punishment and deterrence into a dollar amount, making the
resulting awards much more predictable for defendants.
To establish this new framework, the Court may adopt
something similar to the following language in its next decision
concerning punitive damages: To satisfy the requirements of due
process, a punitive damages award must be explicitly authorized by
the adjudicator when the defendant's conduct is sufficiently
reprehensible and set at an amount consistent with civil penalties
authorized in similar cases. Using language similar to this, the Court
could establish that due process requires the two-step process
described above and ensure that lower courts across the country adopt
the procedure. Obviously, the Supreme Court cannot rewrite state or
federal laws to require this two-step procedure explicitly, but by
holding that due process requires this procedure, it can certainly
require that lower courts use it or otherwise have their punitive
damages awards overturned. While restricting how courts may award
167. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003); BMW of N. Am.
v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 567 (1996).
168. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574 (1996).
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punitive damages, this two-step process still allows lawmakers
sufficient leeway to set civil penalties to achieve the level of deterrence
they determine is most appropriate.
This new framework achieves the goals of punishment and
deterrence better than the current doctrine does, and considering the
Supreme Court's holding in Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 69 as I
describe below, I believe this new framework is actually required by
due process. I do not propose this framework as a grand solution that
will solve all of the problems associated with punitive damages
immediately. However, it does alleviate the main problems currently
associated with punitive damages including the internal logical
inconsistency, the inability of juries to set appropriate amounts of
punitive damages, and the unintentional consequences of increased
punitive damages after State Farm. I also do not claim that the
proposed new framework is necessarily the only solution to the
problems that researchers and the Court itself have identified with
punitive damages. However, it is a convenient solution in that the
Court could adopt it immediately and in that it will allow states
maximum flexibility in adopting measures they deem appropriate for
achieving the goals of punitive damages while still providing
defendants with sufficient notice of their potential liability. The rest of
this Part describes the mechanics of the new framework and why it (or
something similar) is required by due process.
A. The Mechanics of the New Framework
1. Threshold Question: Reprehensibility
The use of the reprehensibility of a defendant's act to
determine punitive damages awards has the appealing quality of
serving the goal of retribution by punishing only the most
blameworthy acts. Additionally, the Supreme Court has consistently
recognized that the reprehensibility of a defendant's actions is the
most important factor in determining whether a given award is
reasonable.170 The problems with reprehensibility only occur when
juries are asked to translate their moral outrage at the defendant's
conduct into a dollar amount.171 Therefore, in order to retain the
benefits of punishing only reprehensible actions while avoiding the
problems associated with asking juries to arrive at a dollar amount,
169. 127 S. Ct. 1057, (2007).
170. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 409 (2003); Gore, 517 U.S. at
567.
171. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 138, at 29-61.
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the Court should simply require an up/down vote from the jury on
whether punitive damages are warranted in a given case.
Requiring that the jury authorize punitive damages without
setting an amount directly preserves the role for the jury and takes
advantage of the fact that juries are relatively adept at determining
the reprehensibility of an action.172 This process also allows individual
juries to determine which actions warrant retribution without settling
on a definitive theory of retribution. 173
The Supreme Court could thus allow lower courts to retain
discretion to punish only those actions they believe are abhorrent
enough to warrant awards beyond compensatory damages. While the
Court would remove the constitutional authority of lower courts to set
the amount of punitive damages as they see fit, the lower courts would
retain full authority to determine when those damages are warranted.
This means that as future research or new methods of setting punitive
damages became available, the appropriate legislature (or other
rulemaking body) could implement them immediately.
2. Similarity to Civil Penalties
The first part of my proposed framework for punitive damages
accomplishes the goal of retribution by allowing courts to punish those
actions they determine are reprehensible enough to warrant
punishment, but it ignores the goal of deterrence. To achieve
deterrence, courts will award punitive damages in an amount
consistent with "the civil penalties authorized or imposed in
comparable cases," which is the third guidepost of determining the
reasonability as outlined in Gore.174 Civil penalties are fines
established by government authorities to punish different infractions.
They are set by either legislatures or regulatory authorities that
possess the institutional competence necessary to set those penalties
at a level to deter individuals from engaging in wrongful conduct.
These government authorities have the luxury of conceptualizing an
entire area of law and determining how best to deter wrongful acts in
that area, as well as having the resources to set those penalties to
achieve the desired level of deterrence.175
172. Id.
173. For a review of how different theories of retribution may impact punitive damages
awards, see generally Polinsky & Shavell, supranote 48.

174. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574.
175. Detailing all of the institutional competencies of legislatures and agencies is beyond the
scope of this Note, but for a general overview, see LISA SCHULTZ BRESSMAN, EDWARD L. RUBIN &
KEVIN M. STACK, THE REGULATORY STATE (2010).
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The parties could obviously disagree over what constitutes a
comparable case and what civil penalty would be imposed in that case,
but courts are perfectly capable of hearing such arguments and
making appropriate decisions. As opposed to setting punitive damages
awards in a complete vacuum with no guidance other than a vague
notion of reprehensibility and deterrence, courts would determine
awards based on what the relevant legislature or regulatory authority
has already authorized as an appropriate civil penalty. Thus, the level
of deterrence achieved by punitive damages will be consistent with
what the relevant government authority has determined is
appropriate. In general, setting punitive awards in this manner will
not achieve the optimal level of deterrence, but since that level is
practically and mathematically unachievable under the current
doctrine, the level of deterrence determined by the legislature or
regulatory body is certainly an appropriate alternative. Using the
level of deterrence deemed appropriate by competent authorities is
certainly preferable to blindly attempting to achieve optimal
deterrence through unqualified jurors. At the very least, this level of
deterrence will not be arbitrarily limited to a specific ratio.176
Setting punitive damages consistent with the third guidepost
in Gore after a determination of reprehensibility by the adjudicator is
advantageous for a number of reasons. First, the guideposts of
reprehensibility and consistency with comparable civil penalties have
already been approved by the Court as constitutional.177 Second, this
new framework, while constraining courts in how they can award
punitive damages in general, allows the relevant legislatures or
regulatory authorities to take as large or small of a role as they see fit.
If the legislature determines that in the face of this new punitive
damages doctrine, current civil penalties constitute sufficient
guidance on setting awards, it need take no action. If the legislature
determines that it wants to impose a detailed prescription for how
courts award punitive damages, it can alter the civil penalties to that
effect.
For example, if in ten years scholars determine a perfect
system for how juries should award punitive damages to achieve

176. This new framework does not explicitly concede that optimal deterrence can never be
achieved. Rather, it simply concedes that the current level of deterrence is arbitrarily
determined. Determining deterrence consistent with what legislatures and agencies have
promulgated is superior to allowing juries to set awards without much guidance and then
capping those awards at an arbitrary level.
177. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574.
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optimal deterrence in every case,178 the legislature or regulatory
authority could simply enact that system as a civil penalty and require
courts to use it in setting all punitive damages awards. In other
words, the concept of a civil penalty is sufficiently broad in this
doctrine to include basically any system a government authority
wishes to use. However, if legislatures decide not to take any action on
punitive damages, then courts still receive sufficient guidance in
setting predictable awards based on the current civil penalties in
place-they simply have to determine what constitutes a comparable
case. 179 Ideally, state legislatures would take some action to provide
courts with some guidance after the implementation of this new
framework since some types of conduct are not traditionally associated
with civil penalties, but if they do not, courts will have to look harder
to find a comparable case for the purposes of determining the relevant
civil penalty.
Finally, this new framework encourages predictability while
maintaining the benefits that the State Farm case endorsed. One of
the main criticisms leveled against punitive damages has been their
unpredictability, 180 but by tying the awards directly to civil penalties,
potential defendants can simply look up the relevant civil penalty to
determine the degree of their liability.'8 ' Similarly, if an individual
jurisdiction decides to enact a more complicated punitive damages
regime, then a defendant could determine exactly what that regime is
and adapt accordingly. In either case, courts will be constrained in
what they can award in punitive damages, but these constraints will
vary across different case types. This variation reflects a more
nuanced approach than the current single-digit ratio and alleviates
many of the concerns associated with imposing an arbitrary cutoff for
punitive damages that has led to unpredictability across award sizes
and has increased award sizes for smaller awards.- For example, a
legislature may authorize a civil penalty that would lead to the
178. For example, scholars may determine in the future that implementing the Polinsky and
Shavell jury instructions with additional information and guidance can achieve the optimal level
of deterrence.
179. The new framework requires no assumptions about legislatures' or regulatory
authorities' willingness to participate. It would likely achieve better results if those bodies
decided to take a more active role, but since civil penalties already exist for many infractions and
harms, courts can use the current statutory and regulatory scheme to guide their punitive
damages awards without lawmaking bodies providing explicit guidance.
180. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416-18 (2003).
181. Whatever liability defendants may face will be written down as a statute or regulation
somewhere, and while litigants may dispute which statute or regulation is most relevant,
defendants will, at the very least, be able to determine what range of monetary liability they may
face for inflicting a particular harm.
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equivalent of a ratio of five to one in one case and a civil penalty that
would lead to the equivalent of a ratio of five hundred to one in
another case.
Defendants obviously receive greater notice of their potential
liability under this proposed framework, and to the extent that the
State Farm ratio has been successful in reducing punitive damages
awards (i.e., in the arena of blockbuster awards), those successes will
be maintained under the new framework. The limit on punitive
damages imposed by State Farm was arbitrary, but it was a limit
required by the Court's view of the Due Process Clause nonetheless.
The new framework sets limits as well, and while those limits may
vary across case types, adjudicators must still set awards under some
type of guidance. At first glance, it seems that the more concrete the
guidance and the more discernible the limits provided under this new
regime, the more likely it will be to produce the desirable results of
providing defendants with sufficient notice of their potential liability.
However, whether the new regime will be superior to the current one
in terms of reducing arbitrarily high awards is ultimately an empirical
question that cannot be answered until the new regime is actually in
place.
B. The Constitutionalityof the New Framework
With the mechanics of the new doctrine as well as its benefits
over the current regime laid out, I now consider whether this new
framework is required by the Due Process Clause and whether the
new framework is, itself, constitutional. Because the Court has
consistently held that retribution and deterrence are the most
important (and only permissible) goals of punitive damages, 182 the
obvious first question is whether the new framework achieves those
goals. As discussed above, by having a jury or judge authorize punitive
damages only when a defendant's conduct is sufficiently
reprehensible, the goal of punishing reprehensible actions will
certainly be achieved. The new framework also accomplishes the goal
of deterrence by requiring that lower courts set punitive damages
consistent with civil penalties.
However, simply because the proposed framework achieves the
goals of punitive damages does not mean that due process requires
this framework. Additionally, because the proposed framework goes
much further in regulating how lower courts award punitive damages
than Gore and State Farm, which simply provided rules that address
182. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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when an award was grossly excessive, some may object to the new
doctrine as not only not required by due process, but beyond the
Court's authority under the Due Process Clause. On both of these
points, the Court's recent decision in PhilipMorris USA v. Williams is
instructive. 183
The Supreme Court explained in Philip Morris USA v.
Williams that "the Constitution imposes certain limits, in respect both
to procedures for awarding punitive damages and to amounts
forbidden as 'grossly excessive.' "184 In fact, in Williams, the Court
declined to even consider whether the award was "grossly excessive"
and based its ruling solely on the procedures used to impose the
award, which it held violated the requirements of due process.185
Therefore, the fact that the proposed framework limits the process by
which lower courts award punitive damages does not put it beyond the
authority of the Court under the Due Process Clause. The Court
demonstrated in Williams that it can limit the procedures used by
lower courts when awarding punitive damages, and the new
framework simply places stricter limits on the award process than the
Court imposed in Williams.
The fact that the Court has the authority to impose this new
framework does not imply that it should impose it even if doing so is
good policy. However, Williams is instructive on when the Court must
limit the process of awarding punitive damages. The Court explained
in the context of due process:
Given the risks of unfairness that we have mentioned, it is constitutionally important
for a court to provide assurance that the jury will ask the right question, not the wrong
one. And given the risks of arbitrariness, the concern for adequate notice . . . -all of
which accompany awards that, today, may be many times the size of such awards in the
18th and 19th centuries-it is particularly important that States avoid procedure that
1 6
unnecessarily deprives juries of proper legal guidance. s

Thus, the Court identified the risk of arbitrariness and the concern for
adequate notice as the determinants of what due process requires in
terms of limiting the procedures by which juries impose punitive
damages awards. It even pointed out the lack of guidance juries
receive in setting awards as a salient problem with the current
system.
Given the Court's holding in Williams, it is clear that due
process requires the new framework (or something similar), which
directly addresses the concerns noted in that case. By requiring that
183.
184.
185.
186.

127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007).
Id. at 1062.
Id. at 1064.
Id.
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juries only authorize punitive damages for reprehensible actions and
set awards consistent with civil penalties, the Court can ensure that
defendants receive adequate notice of their potential liability since
that liability is based on civil penalties that must be publicly
available. The new framework also ensures that juries ask the right
questions by specifically limiting their decisions to two questions
directly related to the goals of punitive damages. Finally, by
eliminating juries' discretion to award whatever amount of damages
they want subject to an arbitrary ratio limitation (which itself may
induce anchoring behavior), the new framework eliminates any risk of
arbitrary awards.
Given the empirical evidence that State Farm has not effectively
lowered either punitive damages in general or the ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages and is actually associated with the unintended
consequence of increased award levels and decreased predictability, a
new doctrine is needed to effectively limit punitive damages awards
consistent with due process. The Court in Williams identified
arbitrariness and concern for notice as the primary factors to consider
when determining what type of limits on the process of awarding
punitive damages are required by due process.187 The proposed
framework is thus the best choice to replace the current doctrine since
it increases predictability, eliminates arbitrary awards, and provides
defendants with more notice of their potential liability.
Because due process requires that the new framework replace
the current doctrine, the only potential barrier to its implementation
is the Seventh Amendment, which guarantees the right to trial by
jury. The proposed framework removes a significant amount of
discretion from juries, which may infringe on litigants' rights to have
their case decided by a jury. The Supreme Court explained in Dimick
v. Schiedt that "the common law rule as it existed at the time of the
adoption of the [U.S.] Constitution" was that "in cases where the
amount of damages was uncertain, their assessment was a matter so
peculiarly within the province of the jury that the Court should not
alter it."1s However, that case referred to compensatory damages, and
nothing in this new framework restricts the jury's determination of
compensatory damages. In fact, the Supreme Court explicitly
exempted punitive damages from the requirements of the Seventh
Amendment right to trial by jury because "[u]nlike the measure of
actual damages suffered ... [the amount of punitive damages is] not
187. Id. at 1064.
188. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 480 (1935) (quoting JOHN D. MAYNE, MAYNE'S TEATISE
ON DAMAGES 571 (1894)).
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really a 'fact' 'tried' by the jury."189 Therefore, any limitations on a
jury's ability to award punitive damages would not run afoul of
constitutional requirements pertaining to the discretion of juries or to
jury trials more generally.
Some states have struck down caps on damages as violating a
state constitutional right to trial by jury. For example, the Supreme
Court of Georgia struck down a cap on noneconomic damages in
.medical malpractice cases under the state constitution.190 This cap
pertained to compensatory damages, 191 however, and the Supreme
Court has explicitly exempted punitive damages from the type of
analysis used in Georgia. 192 Even if it had not, a requirement under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would
obviously supersede any state constitutional requirements. Therefore,
removing the jury's discretion to award punitive damages is not
problematic under the Constitution.
C. A Brief Example
Having established that the new framework not only solves a
number of important problems with the current doctrine on punitive
damages but also may be required by due process, I now provide a
brief example of how the new doctrine might operate. I provide this
only as an example since many states would likely find it worthwhile
to institute new statutory or regulatory guidelines equivalent to civil
penalties that would guide how courts impose punitive damages.
I present an example here that is more involved than a
straightforward application of looking up a monetary penalty and
applying it to a given case. Consider a physician practicing in the state
of Georgia. Suppose this physician negligently harms a patient as part
of a medical procedure, then the patient files suit and obtains a
compensatory damages award of $100,000 that fully compensates her
for the harm she suffered. However, in this case, suppose the
physician engaged in some egregious behavior (e.g., performed surgery
while intoxicated) that the patient thinks deserves punishment and
believes should be deterred.

189. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 446 (2001) (quoting
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 459 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
190. Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218, 223 (Ga. 2010)
(invalidating a cap on noneconomic damages under the state constitution).
191. Id.
192. Dimick, 293 U.S. at 480.
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After the plaintiff makes her case for punitive damages, the
jury (assuming it is a jury trial) would need to determine whether the
physician's conduct is sufficiently reprehensible to warrant punitive
damages. If the jury determines that the physician's conduct was not
sufficiently reprehensible, then it would not authorize punitive
damages. If punitive damages are authorized, then the jury must
authorize a specific amount consistent with the civil penalties.
Georgia does not authorize monetary penalties for medical
malpractice, so the attorneys in the case could not simply cite a
specific statutory provision that provided a penalty.
However, Georgia does empower a regulatory authority to
suspend medical licenses for different types of conduct.193 The
attorneys in this case could, therefore, present evidence on how long
the regulatory authority typically suspends a medical license for the
relevant conduct. Suppose the jury determines that the relevant
conduct typically warrants a suspension of one year. Thus, the jury
has a civil penalty in front of it and only needs to translate it into a
monetary award. However, this translation is significantly easier than
setting an award in a vacuum. The jury could simply determine the
average physician income for the state (with the help of the attorneys
in the case) and use that amount to determine the final monetary
penalty. Assuming that the average physician income is $500,000, the
jury would award punitive damages in the amount of $400,000, which
combined with the compensatory damages award would equal the
total civil penalty. 194
This example demonstrates that even without a state taking
action to enact a new punitive damages regime that provides courts
with concrete civil penalties for all cases, lower courts can still arrive
at meaningful punitive damages awards consistent with existing civil
penalties. In this example, translating the length of suspension of a
medical license into a monetary award using the average physician
salary is easier than setting a punitive damages award in a vacuum.
However, this new regime would function best and provide the
greatest predictability if the state of Georgia took action to specify
civil penalties for medical malpractice that courts could look to.
193. GA. CODE ANN. § 43-34-8 (West 2012).
194. The state has determined (implicitly) that the optimal level of deterrence involves a
penalty of $500,000. Therefore, to achieve this level of deterrence, the jury must impose a total
judgment of $500,000. Since the jury has already determined that this case warrants $100,000 in
compensatory damages, it must impose a punitive damages award of $400,000 to arrive at a final
award of $500,000.
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Defendants receive substantially more notice of their potential
liability even without a specific regime of civil penalties, and with a
specific regime, they would receive maximal notice. In either case,
awards imposed under this new constitutional framework would not
be arbitrary amounts drawn from an underequipped jury.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note makes two principal contributions. First, it extends
and broadens the empirical analysis of punitive damages awards that
other scholars have attempted and demonstrates that State Farm has
not been effective in reducing everyday punitive damages awards and
that it actually had the unintended effect of increasing awards.
Second, it identifies additional shortcomings of the State Farm
doctrine and demonstrates that this framework has caused
unintended effects in the form of higher awards. Based on these
conclusions, it advocates for a new constitutional doctrine on punitive
damages. This proposed framework involves a two-part test
specifically designed to maintain continuity with the Court's current
doctrine while more effectively achieving the goals of punitive
damages that the Court has repeatedly acknowledged. First, a judge
or jury determines whether the defendant's conduct is reprehensible
enough to warrant punitive damages. Second, the court sets the
amount of punitive damages consistent with civil penalties authorized
by the legislature. Because the new framework flows directly from the
Supreme Court's own guideposts for determining what punitive
damages are acceptable, the Court could easily endorse it in the next
punitive damages case it decides. While it will not immediately
achieve all of the benefits of an ideal framework for punitive damages,
it is simple enough and flexible enough to maintain the current
benefits while allowing future policymakers to adjust it to achieve
specific benefits.
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